An Anthropology of Begging

[Johannes Lenhard]

Hello OAC members,

I just joined the site and am really astonished of how interesting the discussions are - I am in this way really looking forward to getting involved in some of them!

However, I do have a current project myself, that I would like to discuss with you in some details and invite you to give me some feedback and just jot down some ideas you have regarding the issues I am raising below. 

I am looking at the act of begging at the moment (in an East London environment doing both, observation and interviews) and try do describe it as a gift.

So far, I have come across many possible differentiations and distinctions that all not properly seem to work out in terms of making sense of what I observe and what the beggars themselves are actually telling me.

The classic theory of the gift (Mauss, Malinowski, Boas) with its heavy emphasize on reciprocity is very hard to defend in the first instance. What are they giving back except for appreciation, a thank you? Might this already be enough to form a 'counter-gift' and in this way create a relationship? Are we to look at what I call a temporal fix - the counter-gift consists in the 'making-it-more-probable' to also get money being in the same situation anytime in the future? Might a 'good conscience' be valued as a counter gift? It additionally seems very problematic to not fall into the trap and perceive of reciprocity in a self-interest fashion - Gouldner's (1960) 'Norm' typology or Sahlin's (1974) continuum might be helpful here to clarify what one means. I am not really content with those ideas so far and none of them seems to hit the core.

So is the gift that one gives to a beggar not really a gift in the classical sense but rather something one might describe as a commodity in Gregory's (1980) words: as an alienable object that is reciprocally independent not creating any relationship in the sense a gift is able to? 

It seems as if the debate is again stuck in between the formalist/substantivist problematic that has been driving the discourse for years. But again the question in my particular case is similarly: in what way is it self-interest (as explained in the reciprocity argument above) that drives the giving, in which way is emotion of importance? Is it possible to follow Carrier (1991) and see the two as ends of a continuum in relation to giving to beggars? 

In a very general sense I am also intrigued by Weiner's (1985, 1992) idea of inalienable possessions: does one actually give (money, good etc) in order to keep more valuable things (credit cards, marriage rings, a way of life) back? Might this be the 'inalienable possession' in this case? It seems also to link up in a certain way with another distinction that I came across in the course of the research: a beggar's regulars (people that see him regularly) and his one-offs (people that he sees once). Regulars don't always give money, but rather fulfill certain wishes (often in terms of food) or simply spend some time with the beggar and devote some thought to his well-being. In this way, one might be able to argue, a more enduring and lasting social bond can be created through acts of giving (of time, talk and wishes). Such a regular also does not hold back - to nevertheless keep with Weiner, his gifts can still be inalienable (taking the distinction she draws in her earlier paper Inalienable Wealth: keeping-while-giving (as is the case with the regular) and giving-for-keeping) and contain a part of the owner (just think of time / talk in this way - you present yourself etc). On the other hand, the one-offs often give money and don't care about the beggar in a way a regular does. It might be here where one can introduce the presented notion of inalienable possessions: giving-for-keeping (as also Godelier (1999) puts forward) - they are giving in order to keep the more valuable possessions.

Does this notion seem completely far-fetched for you in this context?

A further issue is obviously the role money plays in this whole process - 

what difference does it make that it is money that beggars mainly get? Is it right as again Gregory (1980) or also Cheal (1987) point out that money destroys gift economies (in the particular sense that he defines them) and is an expression of 'disembodied interest'? 

Just so far for the moment - there might be some further issues coming up over the next couple of days/weeks I am definitely going to share with you!

Looking forward to your thought!

Best,

Johannes

[Johannes Lenhard]

 To get back to your point, John, I do believe that religious plays a certain role - but I am not convinced that it goes as far as you try to push it somehow. If I understand you correctly you even seem to push it into a somewhat economic (an expression of self-interest qua 'calculated indifference') direction. Do you hint at a relation in which (religious) people give in order to cherish their own good conscience, in order to calm their 'religious' debt? If yes - as you rightly say - how can this then be explained (and in conformity) with any religious belief - 'casual giving' for one's own sake? I in general don't think that religion and self-interest - especially in an instance of giving - go hand in hand; and even less the kind of expression that you seem to put forward. But please correct me if I got your argument wrong - I would be more than interested to hear more in what you think about the matter I put forward (please also feel free to interfere in the points that I threw towards Keith ;))

John McCreery said:

Johannes, you ask if my not wanting to form an on-going relationship with the beggar is just a personal matter. On reflection, I don't think so. I know many people who behave in ways similar to myself. I suspect that the reason has to do with early indoctrination to religious attitudes toward giving. In my own case, a pious Lutheran upbringing included the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus saying to the rich young man that if he wished to go to heaven he should sell all he owned and give the proceeds to the poor, lots and lots of that sort of thing. Even noticing that people did not always act in the way that the Bible says they should did not erase the guilt that always accompanies calculated indifference. 

[John McCreery]

Johannes,

I am not trying to argue that religion is "the" answer. I observe that it is a factor omitted in the classic formulations of the difference between gifts and arms length economic transactions, where gifts are seen as creating and maintaining ongoing relationships while the latter do not, since as soon as payment in full is made the debt is gone and the parties revert to the perfect liberty ascribed to purely economic actors. From this perspective, a "gift" to a beggar is, in most cases, not a gift at all. It more closely resembles a payment that wards off the necessity for further human interaction. But still, there seems to be something missing in this account. What is the good received in exchange for the payment? And who is it received from? Is the good the beggar's gratitude or, more likely, indifference as he turns his attention to another possible donor? 

Here I recall that in his discussion of debt, David Graeber introduces a three-part classification of economic transactions: Primitive communism is the casual exchange of help or favors on the principle "from those who have to those in need" with no thought of immediate or definitely scheduled repayment. Market transactions are the arms-length transactions mentioned above, for which the relevant principle is that debts must be cleared, if not immediately then on schedule. It is, however, the third form of transaction to which I direct your attention: taxes paid as a matter of moral obligation because the king or other "owner" has, so society says, an indelible right to the tax but no payment ever clears the account, the relationship remaining in force even after the payment is made. 

I now observe that the relationship of all three of Graeber's three categories of economic transaction to Mauss's theory of "the Gift" is problematic. The gifts described by Mauss (things like the valuables exchanged in the Kula ring as described by Malinowski) are (1) not spontaneous and casual in the way that primitive communism in everyday life is supposed to work; (2) do not clear relationships and leave the actors perfectly three as arms-length market transactions are supposed to do; and (3) are not exchanged as taxes owed by a debtor to an owner—the politics of Kula are such that the current possessor of a valuable has a choice of trading partners to whom he may pass it on. 

All this is a roundabout way of getting to the conclusion that hearing donations described as "giving" to beggars and drawing on Mauss  to leap to conclusions about their significance as "Gifts" is leaping before we look to see what is actually going on.

How does religion come in? I note, first, that Mauss himself spends a great deal of The Gift discussing the magical implications of gifts, especially the Maori hau, suggesting that every gift is, in fact, a gift of a bit of the giver's self. To me this has distinctly religious overtones. Why? Because, as previously noted, I was brought up Lutheran, steeped in a version of Protestant Christianity that places considerable emphasis on the story of the Good Samaritan and the notion that one should help those in need as a matter of moral obligation. But I have to ask myself, is this notion restricted to the particular sect in which I grew up? The answer is no. Having once upon a time specialized in the anthropology of religion, myth and ritual symbol I remain dimly aware that all of what we might describe as the major evangelical religions, Christianity, Buddhism and Islam preach that caring for those in need is a moral obligation, thus setting up the contradiction I feel when my conscience tells me that I ought to care for the beggar while what I really want to do is go on about my own business. It is sometimes suggested that as a return for my good deed I am "laying up treasures in Heaven" or "acquiring good karma," but that is shifting the enduring relationship with attached moral obligations away from the beggar (whom I don't wish to be permanently attached to) to God, the Buddha, or Allah, leaving me free to give the beggar my change and walk away.

How generalizable is this account? That is a very good question, indeed. Talking to people, watching what they do, noticing the contradictions, constantly cross-checking to see if the data are idiosyncratic or speak to more widespread custom and habit—that's the anthropology here. The theories are only tools for sorting out what we think or hear—not revealed truths.

That's my two cents.

[Johannes Lenhard]

Back again - and thank you, John, for your renewed interest in the discussion raising very interesting points. 

Your first point was that most 'gifts' to beggars are in a classical way not gifts at all - they are self-interested payments to close off the necessity for further contact. I have two nuanced objections to make. First of all, why give at all if I can easily just pass by? Isn't the giving as such (as one of my homeless informants made particularly clear to me yesterday) already a sign of a certain 'understanding'? To be honest, my very first reaction on Weiner's account of 'inalienable' possessions drew me in the same direction than you just alluded (people give in order to keep, close paths offs, secure most valuables etc) - but somehow the giving itself seems already by an indication for a 'relationship' that is different from non-givers (which is the big majority - at least 4/5 never give). Secondly, it is important to note that there is a major difference between types of giver: the most important distinction is to make between 'one-offs' and 'regulars' (as I tried to make sure already in earlier posts). The latter do mostly not give money, but time, talk and respect (they sit down with the beggar, listen und talk to him). For me, they fall in the category of the classic gift, building a relationship (over time) of mutual understanding and respect. The 'one-offs', however, come close to what you said - with the first objections raised above playing in again. They are mostly giving money, often don't even look down and don't want to engage. Nevertheless, they are concerned, want to help, want to give back what they have received, feel sorry - to name but a few possible reasons for them. So again: I would not seem any giving as purely self-interested (although I would not ward off against your earlier criticism: it is ALSO about a good (religious) conscience or the possible 'temporal fix' for one's own bad fate etc). As Keith has tried to suggest as well (see also 'Economic Anthropology'), it is never 'Either...Or', but mostly 'And'. 

As I tried to make clear, it is indeed very important to look at the details when talking about 'giving' to beggars as regards a reference to 'the gift' to address your second objection (including your detour via Graeber). I can definitely see how you deconstruct the mapping of Graber/Mauss - and would follow you in this respect. To look at Graeber's account once more, however, wouldn't it be possible to put the donation to beggars in his first category of primitive communism (even though Keith had objections against this)? Although he does not call it a 'free gift' this might be what comes closest to it - and my major struggle with the almsgiving has so far exactly been how to match it with the classical gift-logic.

I would not want to follow the road to far that in the end, there is a reciprocity (as I tried to sketch above) - for me, the immaterial payback (conscience, fix for future problems etc) is rather romantic and artificial in most cases. Moreover, I also am heavily biased as in putting reciprocity in the category of 'self-interest'. I still can not properly cope with Mauss account - that was not going in this direction. Have you got an idea as to how to see it in the way Mauss wanted it to be seen without drifting towards an argument of egoism? As far as I can see, this is one of the major flaws in the analysis as presented so far. How is it possible or even necessary to depict the almsgiving in a relation of reciprocity? Is it necessary to do so if one is talking about a 'gift'? Again, the way out might need to try to synthesis the seemingly contradictory poles (again following Keith). Both, altruism and self-interest, might play a particular role describing the giving to beggars. As also mentioned above, my analysis would depict 'ideal types' of one-offs and regulars as 'head-and-tail' of the process incorporating (in their ideal forms) self-interest (inalienability=securing one's own territory) and altruism (something close to the pure gift). I would really appreciate a further critique of this. 

Raising the issue of religion again and linking it to the hau, I can not completely follow you. I see the connection that you draw between hau and religion - but can't find this reflected in the following argument. Isn't the hau a property of the thing itself? Ordinarily described as a 'part of the giver' that is still 'part of the object given'. I can't find the relation between giving (Good Samaritan) and the hau. Wasn't the hau supposed to be an explanation for the RETURN rather than the initial gift? Your argument afterwards again follows the aforementioned way in the depth of religion that for me can only illuminate the notion of 'self-interest' (possibly unconscious) in the widest sense (you give to follow your religion and pay your deeds - which is itself already an act of altruism in the begging case - to introduce the distention between giver and non-giver again!). What I however really like is how you introduce the notion of giving to the sacred/God (that Godelier, 1999, proclaimed as a fourth rule of the gift: giving, receiving, reciprocating, giving to the gods). For religious people (which should definitely be one portion of almsgivers and as such a part of the argument), giving to beggars is in a certain way a sacrifice to God - which does as you rightly state not imply a deeper relationship with the beggar that is ultimately only used as a 'mediator'. Nevertheless, this particular instance of almsgiving is a 'proper' gift (in the reciprocal) sense, is it not? 

Obviously, you are completely right that the most important thing in the moment is talking to the people and beggars - but the theory is still not sorted out in the way needed to properly put it in words - and use it as a start for the following adaption with regards to the empirical outcomes. Thank you very much again - I really appreciate your thought and hope you enjoy the debate as much as I do!

[M Izabel]

Begging related to gift, exchange, reciprocity, and even altruism does not excite me anymore after realizing that false analogies sound good but actually do not make sense.  One can say there is no free gift and cite the example that giving a beggar a dollar makes the giver feel good.  That good feeling is the return. How can we quantify feelings then?  Does giving five bucks induce a better feeling and more than that, the best?   Is the good feeling really worth a dollar? Is the satisfaction the giver of a dollar gets comparable to eating a one-dollar chocolate bar? 

I'm not really convinced that there is no free gift.  A criminal who gets a welfare check from the government and uses it to buy and peddle drugs does not give back to the government?  Government is an institution, and I don't think it can feel the goodness of giving.  I also don't think that using the criminal as a statistical number in a government program is a good example for exchange and reciprocity. 

I'm interested to look at begging as the classic social drama of dual opposites such as haves and have-nots, give and receive, rich and poor, dirty and clean, full and hungry, young and old, lucky and unlucky, comfortable and uncomfortable, etc.  Why do we engage in this drama of opposites is more interesting?  Does the beggar who receives establish the economic status of the giver or his sense of self?  Does giving "other" beggars and make the givers their opposite?    

[John McCreery]

Why give at all? Why not just ignore the beggar? These are good questions. The fact of the matter is that I, like most people, don't give to every beggar. Only a few. Why them? Why then? I observe that the obligation to give, felt in my case because of my particular religious upbringing and life experience, must compete for my attention. If I am busy, perhaps rushing to keep an appointment, I am more likely to ignore the beggar. That is also true if I have recently contributed to someone or something else. Conversely, I am more likely to give something to the beggar if I am not in a hurry and on the way to something I regard as self-indulgence. The beggar's presentation of self may also be a factor. When I am in the States, a down-at-the-heels man with a sign that says "Disabled veteran" is more likely to attract my donation than one without a sign.  My daughter was in the U.S. Navy and veterans issues have a particular salience for me. In any case, to give or not to give is a snap decision, not predictable on general principles alone.

[Keith Hart]

Johannes, the problem with this thread for me -- and I contributed to it heavily -- is that it raises too many lines of argument that I have worked on a lot and sometimes can't see the wood for the trees as a result. I need to simplify and would suggest that much of our thinking about economic relations -- whether we call it ideology or theory -- is directly or indirectly about the private property system. Thus the barter myth of money's origin never mentions private property in claiming that a propensity to exchange is a human universal, but barter, as described here, assumes private property as a given and markets are the same thing with money added. The parties are free to release something and to walk away with it. As we know, clearcut private property in things (ius in rem) was arrived at independently in very few civilizations (Rome, China, Britain, maybe Aztecs) and only after a long struggle to undermine collective property rights.

Many of the theories you refer to come out of historical disputes over the prviate alienation of commonly produced and held goods. Anthropologists often draw on these in an eclectic way, but tend to cherry pick them to suit the empirical circumstances they want to understand, while neglecting the larger political issues involved. This is because their prime goal is description of what is rather than any attempt to change it.

What has this got to do with beggars? First an anecdote. My first PhD student, 40 years ago in Manchester, studied a poor caste of potters in Calcutta. She had a lot more trouble with the beggars than most, not just because she was white, but because she had not trained herself not to see them. A beggar thrusts his or her humanity at the passer by and defies us not to recognize the imperative to give to a needy soul. One answer is to define them as a non-person by looking away. I would suggest that London today is not the same as Calcutta and the sheer pressure of beggars less, so that passers by can affird to be more selective in their response. An Israeli friend visited me in Paris recently and was astonished when a beggar smiled at him. None ever showed that at home. My young daughter believes that I should pay more attention to beggars than I do, but I think (only think) that my intransigence towards all of them reflects an individualistic upbringing (you are no good for others unless you look after yourself).

So I believe these encounters are both profoundly significant for our being in society and culturally very rich and nuanced. I would want to know a lot more about the content and variety of these transient relationships before trying to pigeonhole "begging" as a class of social action in a series of received theories about it and analogous transactions. I have also tried to indicate that the questions that frame these encounters go deep and wide, far beyond the reach of an empirical method. That is, however, not to discourage you -- you seem to need no encouragement -- just to express my own inability to come clean at this point and in this medium.

[Johannes Lenhard]

What you refer to in the end (spontaneity) is nicely reflect by Godbout (1998) and again by Osteen (in the introduction to 'Questions of the Gift'). (Derrida takes this a little too far possibly arguing that this characteristic of the gift also entails its impossibility - how can a gift be spontaneous - as soon as you give you think of reward?) 

To take the point to a higher level again, it seems necessary to take the turn that Osteen goes: this seeming impossibility should actually be a sign for the gifts flexibility, instability and uncertainty (all in a 'positive' sense). Just as economists try to encompass every object in a logic of self-interest, rationality and calculation, many theories of the gift coming from sociology or anthropology make up a strict distinction between commodity and gift etc -- as Keith says in a former post again: it might simply be both at a time. There is no need to cut here. 

The remaining question is, however: where does this take us then? For me, the account is plausible, but very 'random' in a sense. I like strictness to a certain extent - and I like clear categories; in this instance, there seems to be no way towards a 'typology' / 'classification' or the like, however. This bothers me in the moment.

John McCreery said:

Why give at all? Why not just ignore the beggar? These are good questions. The fact of the matter is that I, like most people, don't give to every beggar. Only a few. Why them? Why then? I observe that the obligation to give, felt in my case because of my particular religious upbringing and life experience, must compete for my attention. If I am busy, perhaps rushing to keep an appointment, I am more likely to ignore the beggar. That is also true if I have recently contributed to someone or something else. Conversely, I am more likely to give something to the beggar if I am not in a hurry and on the way to something I regard as self-indulgence. The beggar's presentation of self may also be a factor. When I am in the States, a down-at-the-heels man with a sign that says "Disabled veteran" is more likely to attract my donation than one without a sign.  My daughter was in the U.S. Navy and veterans issues have a particular salience for me. In any case, to give or not to give is a snap decision, not predictable on general principles alone.

[Johannes Lenhard]

First of all, thanks a lot Keith, for getting back to the discussion. Admittedly, you are right - and I am currently in a position where I can't see anything anymore - especially no clear outline of any analytical constructs...

I am rather curious on your point about property, however. I already wondered, where this whole debate in the literature (that does not seem to end...) comes from after all. Can you suggest any source that is worth diving into with regards to the issue of alienation / property that you raised? I was not aware that some of the arguments I put forward actually come from a distinct tradition (rather than anthropological thinking about gifts..). 

Just a note with regards to your last paragraph: what I am currently doing is obviously looking at how both sides (the beggar, that I observe and interview) and the giver (that I briefly ask about the reasons for giving) relate to each other. So I look at what you term the 'content and variety'. The ideas / sketches I tried to put forward in this thread try to already reflect those empirical materials (for example in my arguments about one-offs and regulars) - unfortunately it seems quite problematic to share them with you in a way that makes it easier for you to understand my struggles with the analytical 'appendix' (the theory that I want to use in order to somehow 'generalize' / use the beggar as an example). 

The last point I would like to have your comments on in the moment is the following: I have enormous problems in framing the empirical encounter (as I have already tried to explain above) and my further reading as well as the feedback I got here have pushed me into the following direction: I might open up the paper with a literature review focusing on the different dichotomies that are interwoven in the theory of the gift (self-interest vs altruism, gift vs commodity, market vs gift, economy vs non-economy, relationship-building vs hierarchy/power). The main argument coming out of this is (which seems also to be one of the main thesis in the discussion here) that all those dichotomies need to be turned on their head in an elegant way - the gift is not part of a dichotomy in any way. It is not 'either ... or' but 'and' (at certain times, in certain situations and in contexts). The ethnography of begging will then serve as a particular and concrete example to show exactly this. 

Keith Hart said:

Johannes, the problem with this thread for me -- and I contributed to it heavily -- is that it raises too many lines of argument that I have worked on a lot and sometimes can't see the wood for the trees as a result. I need to simplify and would suggest that much of our thinking about economic relations -- whether we call it ideology or theory -- is directly or indirectly about the private property system. Thus the barter myth of money's origin never mentions private property in claiming that a propensity to exchange is a human universal, but barter, as described here, assumes private property as a given and markets are the same thing with money added. The parties are free to release something and to walk away with it. As we know, clearcut private property in things (ius in rem) was arrived at independently in very few civilizations (Rome, China, Britain, maybe Aztecs) and only after a long struggle to undermine collective property rights.

Many of the theories you refer to come out of historical disputes over the prviate alienation of commonly produced and held goods. Anthropologists often draw on these in an eclectic way, but tend to cherry pick them to suit the empirical circumstances they want to understand, while neglecting the larger political issues involved. This is because their prime goal is description of what is rather than any attempt to change it.

What has this got to do with beggars? First an anecdote. My first PhD student, 40 years ago in Manchester, studied a poor caste of potters in Calcutta. She had a lot more trouble with the beggars than most, not just because she was white, but because she had not trained herself not to see them. A beggar thrusts his or her humanity at the passer by and defies us not to recognize the imperative to give to a needy soul. One answer is to define them as a non-person by looking away. I would suggest that London today is not the same as Calcutta and the sheer pressure of beggars less, so that passers by can affird to be more selective in their response. An Israeli friend visited me in Paris recently and was astonished when a beggar smiled at him. None ever showed that at home. My young daughter believes that I should pay more attention to beggars than I do, but I think (only think) that my intransigence towards all of them reflects an individualistic upbringing (you are no good for others unless you look after yourself).

So I believe these encounters are both profoundly significant for our being in society and culturally very rich and nuanced. I would want to know a lot more about the content and variety of these transient relationships before trying to pigeonhole "begging" as a class of social action in a series of received theories about it and analogous transactions. I have also tried to indicate that the questions that frame these encounters go deep and wide, far beyond the reach of an empirical method. That is, however, not to discourage you -- you seem to need no encouragement -- just to express my own inability to come clean at this point and in this medium.

[John McCreery]

I like strictness to a certain extent - and I like clear categories; in this instance, there seems to be no way towards a 'typology' / 'classification' or the like, however. This bothers me in the moment.

Perhaps it is time to question whether typologies or classifications are the best way to get your head around your observations. After all, if there is one thing that the history of science demonstrates clearly, it is that every major scientific advance has involved rejecting a categorical approach to the phenomenon in question. Copernicus, Kepler, Newton and Einstein didn't endlessly debate typological issues in the way that Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas did—they asked not what things are but how they work and developed formulas that describe change over time. Darwin's challenge to the church lay in substituting a description of a process, natural selection, for a scheme in which God prescribes categories given once and forever. A couple of books that have been important in my thinking about these issues are George Lakoff's Women, Fire and Dangerous Things and Andrew Abbott's Methods of Discovery.  I would also highly recommend, when it comes around again, Scott Page's free Coursera course on models.

[Johannes Lenhard]

Hello all,

first of all I want to thank you all for your wonderful feedback on some of my ideas. This has really helped me to developed a certain clarity for my research. Now I have spend a considerable time doing interviews and observation again and just finished writing up my findings.

There are three rather clear questions that are still bothering me:

1. We have talked about the dichotomized gift. I have made this my theoretical starting point. According to this: One strand of theory – the economically influenced exchangists and formalists – argues that gifts result in a (re)production of hierarchy, in inequality.  The other side depict the creation of unifying, equalizing links, of society as such, as the most prevailing result of the gift. For me the most important dichotomy is between the (self-interested) gift that creates (material and immaterial returns and) hierarchy (see for example Bourdieu) and the (free, altruistic) gift that is a matter of equalizing relationships, creating bonds and unifying. From the theory side, is it possible to depict such a dichotomy? 

2. Is it possible to talk about a gift of word and time - of an immaterial gift as it were. Since I make theories of the gift my main theoretical angle and end up talking about the gift and time (after having debated money as a material gift), this question might be raised by critics. So what do anthropologists think - is it possible to follow Godbout in this notion? 

3. I go in my empirical argument then on to argue that the dichotomy has to be resolved following Mauss itself, but also Keith Hart and David Graebers more recent arguments. The gift can be both at a time - at least in my example of the gift to beggars. People might give to please their conscience AND to help the beggar at the same time. The gift might result in further distancing the beggar (especially in the case of money that is estranging and does not create a relationship) or the actual production of an equalising, unifying bond (as I have already tried to formulate for the type of the 'regular'). The question for me here is whether this differentiation can actually hold true. Is it possible to somehow oppose 'unifying bond' against 'hierarchy'? Obviously, it is not the creation of a bond as such that is one pole. It is rather a bond on 'equal levels'. It is not 'inclusion' as such that can be created by the 'right gift'' of words and time for example but a 'making human'. One might object that even hierarchy is a certain relation, a bond - so the crucial difference to make here is the above in my opinion.

Thank you very much again for your help - best,

Johannes

[John McCreery]

I find the idea that the free, altruistic gift is inherently equalizing implausible. The Kula ring, as described by Malinowski, is on close inspection a never-ending game of oneupsmanship that appears to balance from a macro perspective because there are two sets of gifts moving in opposite directions. And, of course, that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son to die for our sins" is not an invitation to consider oneself equal to God. It isn't the gift, whose inherently poisonous character is noted by Mauss, that accounts for the apparent equality in Graeber's and other versions of primitive communism. It is the duty to share, described by Meyer Fortes as the axiom of amity and implemented through reciprocity.

What does the beggar give back?

[Johannes Lenhard]

You are completely right - I guess I didn't express myself clearly enough.

My differentiation in general is rather between gifts that further reproduce inequality, hierarchy and distance and other gifts that are able to form something like an inclusion, a unifying and somehow equalizing bond (being on one level, making them feel human). 

The first is mostly associated with the people that only give once, that are not what I call regulars. The respective gift is the gift of money. The second effect is mainly created by regulars that sit down with the beggar, talk to him and build up mutual knowledge over time. 

To you question what the beggar gives back, two remarks: 

1. I wondered whether relationships induced by the gift are always based on reciprocity. Why is it not possible to actually have a one-sided exchange as Strathern and Weiner argue in a certain way or as Cheal puts forward (for him, it is still somehow reciprocal but on the level of emotions = immaterial rather than material). For me the question really is: can there be a relationship based on a gift that is not materially reciprocal.

2. Even if we do not follow the above road of believing in a non-reciprocal relationship, my argument goes, my research found many instances where beggars actually give back. Materially, some offer returns whereas others try to camouflage the almsgiving as an act of exchange. The first group provides you a cigarette or an artwork as an act of gratitude. The second tries to sell one of the latter or polishes shoes (Barat) – in a similar way than people selling the homeless papers. Others simply return immaterial gifts. They say ‘Thank you’, ‘God bless’ or ‘Good man’, distribute hugs, jokes or bows. They say: ‘No, gifts are not free. They are giving me and I’m not giving them nothing moneywise. But they are getting my happiness. They see me shining.’ One might object - are those not “normal pleasantries”. Would the lack of a thank you not be described as rude? However, the beggars’ replies often go beyond those mere conventions. They have a moral or religious tone ('Good man', 'God bless') or drift into the realm of intimacy (JD’s or Luzy’s hugs). Lastly, some givers might appreciate the silent, invisible counter-gift that Yan calls the possibility of control, prestige or power (Yan 2002). Then even monetary gifts with their potential hierarchical effect form rather than prepare relations – that are not on an equal level, however.