PART TWO: Metaphors Be with You: A Cultural Analysis of Star Wars

Inside the Theatre:  Semiosis in Star Wars

            While the tendency in discussions of the role of technology in modern life is to emphasize the novelty of our situation, marveling at the sensational implications of innovations in biotechnology and computer science, I feel that this popular obsession is simply an outgrowth of a long-standing interest in the mechanical properties of the human body.  The body as mechanism has been a significant concept in Western thought at least since the time of Leonardo, whose anatomical studies paralleled his experiments in mechanical design.  And Descartes, intent in his Discourse on Method on establishing the unique­ness of mankind, details the point-by-point similarities between animal behavior and mechanical motion and thus implies that humans could be inter­changeably animal or machine without their unique gift of conceptual thought and consequent self-knowledge.  It is arguable whether George Lucas and Luke Skywalker belong in the august company of Leonardo and Descartes, but I think their cultural production, the Star Wars trilogy, supersedes the two great thinkers’ learned discourse on the nature of machines. 

            Star Wars, as any film critic or even cinema enthusiast is quick to point out, suffers from minimal character development: Luke, Han, and Leia would be better served by bubble captions taken from a comic strip than by the dialogue supplied them in the movie script.  But such carping misses the essential point that the characterization of machines in Star Wars is unsurpassed by any other movie (and equaled only by a few written works of science fiction, for example, Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot).  Leonardo and Descartes were prepared to consider some of the implications of people-as-machines, but were not charitable enough to the predecessors of our tinny friends to consider the semiotics of machines-as-people.  This is precisely what Star Wars does.

            I have argued throughout the book that myth, which is simply a shorthand term for the culture-generating faculty of the (for now) human mind, operates by subjecting our most cherished ideas to stress along the several semiotic dimensions that intersect to form semiospace.  The pushes and pulls of the resulting vectors move the horizon or boundary of humanity, of a group, or of an individual in the direction of one or other of the juxtaposed identities that lie at the extremities of the semiotic axes.  In this fashion the boundary conditions of ideas that comprise our cultural bedrock, ideas of home and family, love and hate, human and inhuman, are explored and mapped by the holographic engine of our minds.  For example, the experiential domain, “machine,” can be explored only by investigating the significative functions of particular machines in real/reel-life situations.

            Characterization in Star Wars, so weak where its human actors are con­cerned, is amply detailed for its mechanical and quasi-mechanical protagonists.  The interaction of human, mechanical, and quasi-mechanical characters es­tablishes a system of representations that gives form and meaning  new meaning  to the identities “human” and “machine.”  That system of repre­sentations I term mechanosemiosis.  The effect of scrambling human and mechanical attributes in particular characters (notably R2D2 and C3PO but others as well) is to produce a cast whose characters and actions are often anomalous.  Those anomalies are generative  culturally generative  for they encourage the moviegoer to examine his assumptions regarding the difference between himself and the machines in his environment.  Again, the fact that  viewers of Star Wars, like the audiences of “primitive” myth-tellers, are usually children or adolescents only amplifies the movie’s importance, for their minds are still actively sorting out the cultural categories that will become the unquestioned assumptions of their adult lives. 

            Children’s literature has traditionally focused on relationships between young people and animals, the theme of “a boy and his dog” being a perennial favorite.  With Star Wars the central theme becomes “a boy and his droid,” for much of the drama springs from Luke’s interactions with R2D2.  Indeed, it is often difficult to decide who (which) is playing the supporting role.  But as the trilogy unfolds through The Empire Strikes Back and  Return of the Jedi, Luke is clearly the central character, and particularly in Jedi R2D2 is shamelessly upstaged by the teddy bear Ewoks.  In Star Wars, however, R2D2 is in its element, and a close examination of its several roles tells a lot about the movie’s contribution to a totemism of machines. 

            If Star Wars is about our relations with machines (that is, about our mechanical alter-egos), the fundamental issue it must explore is how people and machines communicate.  Phrased differently, the issue is the signifying practices that link persons and machines.  The movie is about ways of signifying, and R2D2 is a central character (quite apart from its cuteness) because it is capable of “conversing” with the widest range of entities. 

            R2D2 engages in four types of “conversation” (it would be more accurate here, particularly given our theme of the transfiguration of language, to say “animation”): with people (usually Luke or Leia); with the anthropomorphic droid C3PO; with  assorted other droids and organics; and with the computer banks of the Death Star.  R2D2’s beeps and whistles somehow possess for human listeners (those in the audience as well as those on screen) a distinctly emotional, endearing quality; people have no difficulty attributing moods and motivations to the charming little cylinder.  At the same time, C3PO, whose official function is translation (he continually boasts of his fluency in three million languages), is on hand to render R2D2’s electronic beeps as human speech.  Luke, Leia, Han and, by extension, the audience thus have the dual ability to react directly and emotively to R2D2’s machine noises on a mechanosemiotic channel and to comprehend their “literal” meaning on an anthroposemiotic channel through C3PO’s translation.  No other film goes so far in exploring the communicative interaction between human and machine; it is one of the firsts that puts Star Wars on the cinematic map regardless of its box office. 

            With its faithful droid companion translating at its side, R2D2 thus maintains two open channels between itself and its less articulate human friends, Luke, Han, and Leia.  Through these channels R2D2 transmits information it acquires from conversations, or animations, with nonhuman interlocutors.  The most important of these are the Death Star computer and, in Jedi, the computer of the Imperial Guard base.  It is quite remarkable that just as the personal computer craze was getting under way, Lucas presented the world with a character that is a perfect interface: R2D2 is every hacker’s dream of a user-friendly, dynamic little fellow that has at its receptacle tips all the computing power of a latter day Armonk mainframe.  It is probably too extreme to claim that the personal computer phenomenon that followed on the heels of Star Wars is a case of life imitating art, but the coincidence of the two does show that Lucas’s characterization of R2D2 touched an exceptionally responsive nerve in the formative minds of the movie’s juvenile audiences. 

            Here it is useful to recall the episode of the bookstore.  Like Jabba the Hutt, R2D2 attained star billing without speaking a word of English (or any other human language).  If we except Lassie’s seminal barks, Flipper’s thought-provoking whistles, the Black Stallion’s meaningful whinnies, and that ilk of anthropomorphized animal communication, we could search almost fruitlessly in the history of film for a star that lacked an intelligible voice (agreeing not to count Victor Mature’s cave man impersonation in One Million B. C.).  R2D2’s remarkable ability to communicate in electronic beeps and whistles (fore­shadowed by Harpo Marx?) taps the same vein as the mystification adults feel before their children’s easy acceptance of electronic media of all sorts, particularly the home computer the kids have talked their folks into buying.  Although the marketing folks at IBM and Apple will not come right out and say it, in a world of bookmarks without books the computer as an accessing device with instant graphics and menu-driven programs resembles the book­mark more than the book.  And there is little doubt which the young audiences of Star Wars and the child browsers in my bookstore found more interesting and communicative. 

            These remarks should not be taken as yet another verse of the intellectual’s familiar dirge mourning the death of literacy.  It is rather that the signifying practices employed by R2D2 and his interlocutors in Star Wars represent a novel form of semiosis, one quite distinct from that installed in the dominant complex of writing-printing-reading.  This form of signifying practice, again, is what I have termed mechanosemiosis (the way out of pedantry here seems to spawn yet more pedantic terms).  Whatever we choose to call it,  mechano­semiotic communication does not replace conventional language but grafts onto it to form a hybrid semiotic system (much in the way that linguistic communication has grafted onto a rich nonverbal substratum of expression and gesture to form the currently dominant anthroposemiotic mode of sign production).  As the pioneer of this new mix of communicative channels, R2D2 already has the ability only dreamed of by present day hackers to combine three-dimensional visual and graphic displays with its aural productions (a vivid example being the holographic message R2D2 delivers from Leia in the first movie).  Now that multimedia programs operating in a Windows environment (we humans do not have a lock on virtuality!) have made their way onto your or, at least, your neighbor’s CD-ROM drive, it seems inevitable that children of the twenty-first century will learn their ABCs (which will no longer be ABCs, but elements of the new hybrid semiotic system) at the consoles of machines capable of assembling word, image, and schematization into a communicative form substantially different from our present written language. 

            It is only some five thousand years since the Sumerians or their mysterious neighbors began scratching cuneiform word-signs on clay tablets.  And it is only some three thousand years since the Phoenicians developed a phono­gramic syllabary (that is, a system of writing that represents the common vowel sounds as well as the less variant consonants) from which our own alphabet derives.  Given such a shallow history in comparison with the much deeper past of fully human aural language, why should we expect the “written” language of 7000 A.D. to resemble today’s phonogramic printed texts any more than those resemble Sumerian cuneiform or Phoenician script?  If anything, grammatologists of the distant future are likely to regard our abstract, image-bereft phonetic transcription as an impoverished aberration in the history of writing.  They may well see our cherished writing-printing-reading complex as an unfortunate lapse in the history of human semiosis, a Dark Age of a few thousand years, which separated the early and late expressive, iconic forms of Egyptian hieroglyphics and future multimedia software.  For both those representational systems succeed in combining abstract phonetic symbols or word-signs with visual images or displays of the subject matter. 

            You’re wringing your hands that Johnny can’t read, that SAT scores con­tinue to decline nationwide?  Well, maybe Johnny’s little cerebrum is not just atrophying as he slaps away at his SuperNintendo joystick; maybe it is being sucked into the maw of Something Else, some strange attractor that does not respect the tidy, linear boundary we habitually erect between writing and visualizing, that instead gravitates around the process of narration-as-knowing described in Chapter 2.  From this perspective, the teamwork exhibited by R2D2 and C3PO in Star Wars would seem both prophetic and indicative of a critical period  our own  in the (d)evolution of language, when people-speak and machine-speak began to fuse into a hybrid anthropo-mechano-semiotic. 

            The users of language (who are also its producers) are not, however, attuned to these speculative refrains; they are not grammatologists nor philosophers of language.  For the most part they are ordinary people living ordinary lives, people who build houses and people who (as Merle Haggard would say) still keep them, people who watch an awful lot of TV, and people who take their kids to movies like Star Wars.  The world of the movie theatre they enter is not a sedate realm of theoretical discourse regarding the nature and evolution of language; it is an active, noisy world of presentation and spectacle.  What they spectate, however, may well be symbolic distillations of critical theoretical issues.  Ironically it is those plain folks, who do more chatting and rapping, shucking and jiving than “discoursing,” and who spend more time using tools and manipulating joysticks than composing on a word processor, who will determine the future of language. 

            R2D2’s antics are just the kind of seminal spectacle that provides a sense of direction, an orientation, for people adrift in a situation of rapid linguistic transformation.  And R2D2’s antics are far more instructive than a pro­grammer’s manual for individuals, especially very young individuals, just awakening to the possibilities offered by the host of clever machines that surround them.  While computer use and computerese will not replace our existing languages any more than speech has erased the play of features on the human face or writing silenced the daily flow of speech, the interfaced teenager of the near future will be communicating in a mode fundamentally different from his paper-bound ancestor of the twentieth century.  What did Sumerian grandfathers and grandmothers think of their grandchildren’s peculiar scratchings way back at the dawn of writing?  Some of us may have a pretty good sense of that experience right now.

            What might be called a “hardware bias” or, perhaps, a mechanotropism (a malapropism?!) in Star Wars is evident in the contrasting characterizations of R2D2 and C3PO.  Before the advent of personal computers and video games, movies handled machines and, implicitly, the topic of mechanosemiotics by the familiar device of humanizing the machine: robots were given arms, legs, facial features and a voice that was recognizably human (and English-speaking).  One of the more memorable figures of this kind is Robby the Robot, featured in the 1956 classic, Forbidden Planet.  But now, in just a few frenzied decades, the ground rules for machine representation have changed dramatically.  The proof of this sea change is that C3PO, anthropomorphic and articulate though it is (cast in the mold, so to speak, of Robby the Robot), has second billing behind R2D2, who/which lacks most of the standard humanized robotic fea­tures of yesteryear.  R2D2 does not have a face. 

            Although the media has not quite faced up to it (it currently has its hands full with the gender issue spawned by another liberation movement) we are experiencing, in the waning days of the twentieth century, the early throes of another movement: machine lib.  The transition from Robby to R2D2 demon­strates that machines can now assert their own identities with pride and need no longer masquerade their silicony inner selves beneath layers of makeup and prosthetic devices designed to lend them a counterfeit human appearance.

            Perhaps the next phase of this new movement (once past the bra-burning period) is an intensified assault on those inchoate pronouns whose tremendous metaphoric power has been aptly described by James Fernandez.  The little words “he” and “she” have become almost indigestible for us (post)moderns, who agonize over the ideological implications of using one or the other in speaking or, especially,  writing about situations in which the subject is not specifically gender-marked.  So we are forced into circuitous barbarisms of language, such as:

 

    The writer should take her or his inspiration from events she or he has experienced herself or himself and describe their effect on her or him to the best of her or his ability.  

 

Yet lost in all the eggshell-walking and consciousness-raising of the last twenty-plus years is the anonymous, unheralded third-person pronoun, the very type case of inchoateness: the impersonal it

            Paradoxically, as we lavish more and more attention on the insidious gender biases in our daily speech and behavior, as we strive to level the playing field on which men and women must live and work, we push all the myriad its in our lives further back in the shadows.  Bill Murray and Richard Dreyfuss got us to wondering What about Bob?; in this work I want to get us wondering What about It?  I think this project is supremely important, maybe even more important than Bob, for our ideological slighting of impersonal things bizarrely parallels their ever-increasing importance in our lives. 

            It is safe to say that a great many of us fin de siècle (post)moderns spend more of our waking hours staring into a computer monitor than into another human face, and more time touching its keys and massaging its “mouse” than caressing another human being.  And when we finally break away from the enchanting, demanding Cyclops on our office desk and make our way through the gridlocked streets choked with (what else?) other machines to our condo apartment, the warm, affectionate being waiting to greet us and give us unequivocal love is as likely to have four legs as two.  Machines and animals, these parameters of modern existence, assert their presence in our lives as never before.  They have emigrated from the factory and barnyard, where they could be kept at arm’s distance and treated as objects, forced to labor or slaughtered at our whim, to the core of our domestic world  into our homes, our hearts, and even our beds.  With the Shih Tzu or Siamese snuggled next to us and the TV clicker resting on the other, empty pillow, we end our day, drifting in and out of consciousness, with Leno or Letterman, and are roused from sleep the next morning by Katie Couric’s chirpy, cheerleaderly excla­mations on the Today Show.

            We have seen this pattern of attraction-avoidance, love-hate before: our shunning the impersonal its in our lives while establishing increasingly intimate ties with them is yet another schismogenic principle that fuels the crushing ambivalence of the myth of America.  Even without reading a lot of paleon­tology, we somehow know that the machine is part of our innermost self, that it has participated in the birth of our species.  Yet this truth weighs heavily on a consciousness awash in ideas about human uniqueness and human control of the environment.  And so we react with horror to the urgings  the voice, if you will  of the machine-selves stirring within us, eager for their time of release from the bondage of inchoateness.  C3PO and R2D2, with their con­trasting mechanical and human attributes, show the way through a part of this labyrinth, and point us in the direction American movie-myth, in the instances of Terminator and Terminator 2, is taking us through the frothy reaches of semiospace. 

            C3PO fails to win the hearts of the audience precisely because it is presented as too artificially human.  Although it possesses a human form, it also parades those traits of stiffness and preciousness that make us say of some people that they “behave like machines.”  Conversely, the secret of R2D2’s charm (mobile trash can though it is) seems to reside in its ambling, lackadaisical manner, one that we associate with someone who is relaxed and “acting natural.”  R2D2’s spontaneity, affability, and loyalty are attributes we increasingly look for in the machines that enter our lives.  An earlier, tremendously popular quest for a compatible and fulfilling human relationship (the great R-word enshrined in California culture), conducted in innumerable counseling and encounter sessions across the land, has given ground to the search for truly user-friendly machines and programs.  The turbo-charged joys of your new 325i or 486DX may not be true love, but they are a marvelous distraction until that (or the Repo Man) comes along.  Caught up as we are in that distracted quest, R2D2, C3PO, and by extension the entire Star Wars trilogy stand as a beacon light to direct the continuing synthesis of human and machine. 

            The ambivalence of myth works through other combinations of human and mechanical properties found in the Star Wars characters representing the Dark Force: Darth Vader, Commander Tarkin, and the Imperial Guard. 

            The Imperial Guard, those (anomalously) white-helmeted and armored soldiers forever pursuing Luke and Han, send the simplest message in the mechanosemiotic system of Star Wars: Machines are hostile, impersonal in­struments of our destruction.  It is the eternal, paranoid fear of our deepest machine-angst: They are out to get us.  Viewed as a metaphor of human experience, the Imperial Guard are the epitome of men in uniform: faceless, incorporeal, stripped of all vestiges of personal identity and made to function with ruthless efficiency in the service of an evil State.  They are the Nazis, Japs, and Commissars we have learned to hate reflexively, throughout the endless siege of war movies: John Wayne showed the way for Rambo and Braddock (Chuck Norris’s Missing in Action character) to follow. 

            Once again, however, Star Wars pushes a clichéd image of the machine (in this case, that of mindless destroyer) into unfamiliar territory.  Although they appear to be living men, the Imperial Guard are so very anonymous and servile that the strong suspicion arises in the viewer from the beginning of the movie as to whether they are human at all.  It turns out that they are not.  Introduced in the guise of “men in (futuristic) uniform,” it later becomes clear that the Imperial Guard are another peculiarly interstitial species in the bizarre menagerie of “mechanicals” and “organics” that populates the “far, far away galaxy” of Star Wars.  The viewer’s suspicion is dramatically confirmed during one of the endless shootouts (beamouts?) between our heroes, Luke and Han, and the Guard.  Luke blasts a pursuing Guardsman (Guardsit?  the impersonal pronoun asserts itself once more), who/which explodes into fragments of metallic white armor.  As he gazes in astonishment at the robotic rubble, Han, more experienced in the ways of the Empire, explains to young Skywalker that there is nothing inside the lifeless armor shell of the Imperial Guard.  The audience, sharing Luke’s naiveté, comes to realize that while certain droids (R2D2 and C3PO) may look mechanical yet have hearts of gold-plated silicon, others, like the Imperial Guard, may resemble uniformed soldiers yet contain not a shred of human flesh or feeling. 

            The robotic nature of the Imperial Guard serves to highlight the movies’ characterizations of two other quasi-human, quasi-mechanical figures: the Imperial expeditionary force headed by Commander Tarkin, and the complex and terrifying Darth Vader.  Tarkin and his staff of officers represent the conventional notion of the military in the service of a totalitarian state.  They are the movies’ flesh and blood Nazis, and as such are deeply etched in the cinema-going retinas of three generations of Americans.  Their inhuman stiffness and blind obedience only serve to emphasize the evil side of machines (the Dark Force), which all too often manifests itself in human groups such as gangs, mobs, and military units and leads us to renounce their inhumane, mindless violence as an aspect of soulless, mechanical behavior. 

            R2D2 is a machine that acts like a friend; C3PO is a machine that looks like a person but that behaves pompously; the Imperial Guard look about as human as C3PO but act utterly inhuman; the military officers of Tarkin’s force are men who have abandoned their personal integrity and embraced the cruelty of unthinking, unfeeling machines in the service of the Death Star and its Dark Force.  What/who, then, is Darth Vader? 

            Vader is the sustaining enigma of the entire Star Wars trilogy: while Han, Leia, R2D2, C3PO, and Chewy undergo no dramatic transformation from film to film (and Luke’s coming of age as a Jedi Knight is entirely predictable), Vader’s identity and moral struggles are the consuming issues that drive the plot.  In the first episode, Vader is introduced as little more than a high-tech black hat, a helmeted and cloaked (à la Oilcan Harry), raspy-voiced villain intent on destroying our youthful hero and a few civilized worlds along with him.  There is, however, an eeriness about Vader right from the beginning that defies this easy stereotype, and that increases as the story unfolds.  In the light fantastic of the mechanosemiosis of Star Wars, Vader is a dangerous riddle.  The other characters, however anomalous with respect to “human” and “machine” domains, at least declare themselves; the audience can rely on their continuity even if it can’t quite classify them. 

            But with Vader it is a different story.  The old black hat whom we loved to hate in the first movie miraculously becomes the embattled, tragic father who sacrifices his life for his only son in Jedi.  His rehabilitation is perhaps the most staggering, and likely the shabbiest, in contemporary film.  Consider that here is a figure responsible for the genocidal bombing of entire planets, who undergoes a change of heart and ends his career as a near-saint (a member, along with Obe Wan Kenobi and Yota, of the Jedi empyrean).  That Lucas succeeds in leading his young audiences from booing to cheering Vader is, at best, a frightening commentary on our moral sensibility and, at worst, an ultimate victory for the Dark Force that his trilogy purports to reject. 

            It would be inadequate, however, to point out the alarming implications Vader’s redemption has for our moral conscience without specifying the particulars, the exact cultural basis, of his transformation.  Such specifying or dissecting is always the task of cultural analysis, whether or not that involves, as in the present case, an unflinching examination of the pathology of our (post)modern lives.  In Jedi Lucas presents his audiences with powerful reasons for believing in Vader’s goodness, and a consideration of those reasons provides important evidence for the nature of cultural processes and the semiotic dimensions along which they operate. 

            Vader is so terribly important because his persona and history produce major movements or perturbations along all three semiotic axes, with the consequence that the nature of humanity is questioned and highlighted from every possible direction.  The most obvious example is Vader’s dramatic rejection of the Dark Force.  By destroying the satanic Emperor who dwells at the heart of that satanic machine, the Death Star, he redeems his Jedi knighthood and demonstrates that the world’s malevolence can be overcome by the benevolent (Life) Force. 

            But who/what does the overcoming?  Is Vader human, machine, or even some kind of diabolically clever animal?  And is he inexorably an alien Other or, improbable as it seems at the outset, might he be one of Our own flesh and blood?  As an exemplary case of the ambivalence of myth, neither question has a definitive answer.  For Vader is both an especially disturbing synthesis of human and machine, a cyborg, and an ambiguous combination of mortal enemy and loving father.  Wrestling with these contradictions, which is the essence of myth, is what gives the trilogy its dramatic clout and audience appeal.  While R2D2 also poses the puzzle of a blurred human/machine identity, Vader drives that stake into the heart of the moviegoer by showing him how a man can lose and then regain his fundamental humanity.  That odyssey occupies much of Empire and most of Jedi, and takes the form of a series of glimpses into Vader’s physical and psychological make-up. 

            The first movie of the trilogy provides only a single, chilling glimpse of Vader removing his fearsome helmet.  In the half-light of his quarters and partly obscured by a wall, Vader reveals the merest flash of what appears to be a skull stripped down to raw flesh and protruding brain matter.  It is just enough to set the hook of a suspicion that Vader is corporeal, unlike the hollow, mechanistic Imperial Guard whose uniform resembles his.  But that suspicion is clouded in Empire when, during Luke and Vader’s titanic struggle, Luke’s light saber slashes into Vader’s arm and reveals only metal, plastic, and wires.  It then seems that our villain is as cold-heartedly mechanical as his actions make him appear.  That feeling is strengthened by Empire’s most traumatic moment, which ends the fight scene:  with a blow of his light saber, Vader slices off Luke’s hand and our hero falls tumbling into empty space.  That epic combat is rendered as Oedipal burlesque with Vader’s taunting revelation, as Luke stares aghast at his severed limb, that he is Luke’s father (but, but . . ., as Joe Pesci of Lethal Weapon might stammer, but Dad, why’d you chop off my hand?).  Now the audience is really confused: the possibility that Vader is human or, again in the language of the trilogy, an “organic” seems ruled out by our look at his wiring, but then there is that shattering (if true) cruel claim of paternity.  Once more, the semiotic pushes and pulls along the animal-human-artifact continuum act as vectorial processes that fix identities of Self and Other, family and enemy.  Might big bad Vader be dear old Dad? 

            Luke’s quest for his identity, which takes the form of a search for his missing father, is the driving force of Jedi.  As the plot unfolds he is drawn to the abhorrent conclusion that Vader’s taunting claim is accurate.  A mys­terious rapport develops between them, with each sensing the other’s presence during the interstellar game of cat-and-mouse between rebel and Empire forces that occupies much of the movie.  The episode of the severed hand in Empire reasserts itself as an emblem of similitude in Jedi: in Luke and Vader’s final confrontation a wound opened in Luke’s now bionized hand evokes pa­ternal emotion in Vader; father and son recognize their shared identity, not as flesh and blood, but as cyborgs.  It is a telling episode in the mechanosemiotics of Star Wars, for the initial dilemma of Vader’s paternity is resolved only by Luke’s meeting him part way along the road to cyborghood. 

            As befits a myth the time frame of Star Wars is hazily sketched, but one supposes that Jedi Knights (particularly Yota, who admits to being several hundred years old) have been around a long time.  Vader may well be ancient, and have acquired his cyborganic features one at a time (the way E. F. Hutton measures its success with investors) in countless joustings.  We are left to wonder whether, as the years go by, Luke, our towheaded, impetuous country boy, will lose other limbs in defending his new government against future eruptions of the Dark Force?  And as the centuries pass will he, like his father before him, require a helmet and speech synthesizer simply to stay “alive”? Recall their deathbed scene in Jedi, when Vader asks Luke to remove his helmet and Luke protests, already knowing that his father’s helmet is essential to maintain “his” life. 

            How droid-like is young Skywalker himself destined to become?  Luke finds his father, and himself, but his quest takes him over the twisting, turning border of any conventional notion of humanity, in which flesh and blood beget flesh and blood in an idiom of kinship that serves as an anchor for human experience.  But this unsettling discovery cannot be a complete surprise to us (or else it would not surface in myth!); similar traumatic confusions of mechanical-human identity are already being played out in the high-tech environments of our hospitals’ intensive care units. 

            The Star Wars trilogy is an epic in the totemism of machines, and yet it moves, paradoxically, toward a renunciation of machines.  The final minutes of Jedi do not feature Luke, R2D2, and C3PO in a celebratory scene of boy and droids: instead those parting shots depict a boy, his spectral father, and his newly discovered sister (Leia) with her intended, Han.  The epic of machines has become an epic of family and kinship.  Far from offering a resolution to the elemental dilemma of future human-machine relations, Jedi shamelessly retreats into nostalgia.  Luke is destined to remain a sexless caricature, an impossible man-child, with the discovery of his siblingship with Leia having put to rest Han’s fear and the audience’s speculation that her affections were directed toward Luke rather than the swashbuckling starship pilot.  And with the Empire on the run, Han and Leia can presumably settle down to per­petuating the race, like John Houseman’s stockbroker, in the old-fashioned way.  The fantastic menageries of the Tatooine bar and Jabba’s lair, the bewildering assortment of “mechanicals” in Jabba’s android repair shop, and Luke’s own considerable potential as a cyborg, all these fascinating scenes and possibilities are left hanging, relegated to the status of gawping curiosities by Jedi’s threadbare ending. 

            The movie’s capitulation is most strikingly apparent in R2D2’s and C3PO’s subordination to the Ewoks.  From the novel theme of a boy and his droid, Lucas drifts into the nostalgic scenario of the teddy bears’ picnic.  The domesticity of animated stuffed bears replaces the technological innovation of droids, and signals an abrupt end to the movie’s wondering about the crucial role machines will have in the future of an emerging cyborganic humanity.  In the final scene of Jedi R2D2 and C3PO are left standing on the sidelines, with nothing to do but go along with the Ewoks’ idea of a good time.  With the battles fought and won, there is no indication of a meaningful role for the two droids in the peaceful world of home and family, where teddy bears and nurseries will presumably replace murderous engagements with killer droids in the corridors of starships.  The trilogy thus ends on  a flat, conservative note; all the intriguing life forms, organic and mechanical, presented in the three movies ultimately comprise only an exotic backdrop for playing out a tiresome melodrama of filial and fraternal love. 

            It would, however, be both too harsh and incorrect to see the conclusion of the trilogy as a meaningless flight into the fantasy of a domestic world free of intrusive machines.  It is a flight, and a regrettable one for the ongoing project of mechanosemiosis, but it is far from meaningless.  In relegating R2D2 and C3PO to obscurity at the trilogy’s conclusion, Lucas underscores what must be Jedi’s ultimate point: machines in the hands of the State are so terrifying that it is best to minimize one’s personal involvement with them.  They are always potential traitors when ensconced around the domestic hearth.  This machine-dread ushers in a paralyzing ambivalence, for so much in the three movies celebrates the intimacy of the human-machine relationship.  The platonic love  affair between boy and droid withers away, leaving the characters and the audience with a renewed suspicion and loathing of machines as alien op­pressors.  In the glass bead game played out on the silver screens of our movie theatres, Jedi points the way to Terminator

            The trilogy’s flawed conclusion only serves to remind us of the threat posed by machines in the service of a powerful and destructive State.  There could be no more forceful reminder of that threat than the Death Star, the focus of action throughout all three movies.  Luke pursues and does battle with the Death Star; Vader, in the Death Star, pursues and does battle with Luke; this two line summary is effectively the plot of the entire trilogy.  Luke and the rebels finish off the ultimate technological horror at the conclusion of Star Wars only to face, in the best supergrosser tradition, a Death Star II in Empire

            The Death Star, as the ultimate killing machine, is R2D2’s opposite number and a structural counterpoint in the trilogy’s totemism of machines.  Its construction and special effects rendering are among the movies’ most impressive technical accomplishments, a fact all too easily lost sight of in the swirl of fantastic beings and scenes.  The scale and detail of the Death Star impart a sense of overwhelming complexity; it is Hollywood’s version of the biggest machine in the galaxy, presented to audiences for their comparison with the machines in daily life (including the daily life of newspaper reading and TV watching, which for a decade was filled with discussions of real-life, Ronald Reagan-style “Star Wars” scenarios).

            The Death Star is the worst case of those scenarios, the projection of a machine-dread that began over two million years ago, when beings that were only on their way to becoming human first experienced the quasi-independent, action-at-a-distance effects of pebble choppers struck from the stone of Olduvai.  That episode first awakened the spark of an artifactual intelligence which would place death rays in the sky above.  That image of the machine as a colossal evil, a Thanatos in stone or steel, has stalked us from those hominid beginnings to our present civilized condition in which the technological ability is present to realize our worst fears.  The alarming possibility that the State and the machines it constructs are homologous, that a world capable of putting Star Wars weapons on the drawing board is fully capable of using them in an all-out global conflagration, leads us to contemplate the harsh realities that Star Wars, myth that it is, at once conceals and parades.

            The real turning point in Jedi, the episode that paves the way for the movie’s fatuous ending, is Luke and Vader’s light saber duel in the Emperor’s chamber.  In that duel Vader’s paternal feelings overcome his commitment to the Emperor and the Dark Force.  Kinship sentiments triumph over blind devotion to the technological State and its satanic leader.  Vader’s change of heart, the redemption of the old genocide, is made the more dramatic by the characterization of the Emperor as a wicked old man.  At the heart of the ultimate machine dwells a corporeal emblem of the Dark Force: the Emperor is not a “mechanical,” nor even a master engineer of a technocratic and totalitarian society; he is a human embodiment of malign spiritual power, a sorcerer. 

            It is this final, stark equivalence of technology and human evil that makes it impossible for the trilogy to conclude on any kind of forward-looking view of the human-machine relationship.  The evil presence at the heart of the Death Star is just a conventional, storybook boogeyman; the mechanosemiotics of an evolving human/cyborg identity is silenced by this bland device.  Lucas could have made things much more interesting, and may not even have damaged his box office in the process.  But inviting the audience to consider Luke’s future with his droid sidekicks would raise some scary possibilities. 

            At the close of Jedi Luke is the warrior leader of a victorious armed force, which presumably will move into the power vacuum left by the destruction of the Emperor and Death Star.  But that places him in a situation much like that his father, Darth Vader, faced as a young Jedi knight who proudly served a State he idealized.  We have already considered the possibility that Luke will become increasingly cyborganic as time goes by; what if he becomes corrupt with his power as well?  What guarantees that our young warrior will not end up as an elite member of an infernal military government, as his father did?  The price paid for Vader’s redemption is our incipient distrust for his son after their reconciliation: “like father, like son” is a formula still too near to mind even “long ago, in a galaxy far, far away.”  This is why the trilogy rejects its own impetus toward fashioning a new mechanosemiotic system of representations and peters out in the machine-rejecting, pseudo-primitivist finale of the teddy bears’ picnic. 

 

Outside the Theatre:  Luke Skywalker, James Bond, and Indiana Jones

in the Not-So-Lost Temple of the Technological State

            An important lesson to be learned from Jedi’s renunciation of its own problematic is that the cultural logic, or medialogiques, of American movies does not generate a simple progression from minimal to maximal involvement with machines.  Myth, whether in the form of movies or traditional narratives, does not follow along in the footsteps of a supposedly linear historical process, for the task of constructing history itself falls to the culturally generative interactions of identity and difference within the six semiotic domains.  The distinguishing feature of myth is its restless hunting along the axes of opposing semiotic domains that bracket, instantiate, and transform human identity.  Our folklore, including its celluloid manifestation in film, does not provide a consistent and sequential account of our history because neither folklore nor history is a chronicle, a transparent and linear recitation of events.  Both myth and its derivative, history, are parts of a ceaseless struggle to resolve antagonistic properties of a mercurial construction, humanity, that possesses no consistency or stasis and that is always on its way to Something Else. 

            A principal antagonism, one that has played as large a part as any in shaping what we now call “humanity,” is a love/hate triangle that has raged for ten thousand years (or as long as “civilization” has existed): the affair among the Individual, the State, and the Machine.  Political philosophy before Marx, from Plato and Aristotle right through Hobbes, Locke, and Hegel, has focused on the abstract (and unrealistic) dyad of Individual/State and largely ignored the dynamic, mechanized context in which it operates.  Marxian political philosophy, while it emphasizes the mediated nature of the Individual–State relationship by introducing the concept of mode of production, still denies the machine any cultural properties of its own.  For Marx, who did so much to publicize the State function of machines as harnesses of labor, the machine itself remains a mute and passive token in the implacable struggle of social classes.  What would old Karl have thought about R2D2 or the SAL-9000? 

            The improbable contribution Star Wars makes to political theory, if only implicitly, is to bring home the hard fact of our deep ambivalence toward the machines in our lives.  What we do with them and what others do to us using them are subjects of great concern and carry the most highly charged positive and negative overtones.  Consequently, the characters of American folklore never simply accept or reject machines; they alternately glory in and smash them.  In their mythologized lives, folk heroes exemplify the mixed feelings we mortals carry with us when we leave the theatre and return to our waking lives outside the Dreamtime temples of our cities and suburbs. 

            John Henry, Wild Bill Hickock, James Bond, and Luke Skywalker repre­sent distinct amplitudes, or Fernandezian movements, in the mechanosemiotic processes that shape (or situate) human identity.  For all their exaggerated attributes these disparate folk heroes have enough in common with our own mechanized lives to serve as dramatic tokens of the technically expert individual confronting the technological State.  Taken together they chart a virtual world of possible experiences theoretically open to us all as we pursue our daily lives outside the theatre.  But this virtual world is one of extremes.  John Henry dies from his confrontation with the Company’s machine; James Bond drifts into a flippant accommodation with the multinational corporations and superpowers that employ him; Luke Skywalker accepts bionic parts without a thought of where that might lead.  Tucked among these mythic extremes are our own virtual and realized experiences with the machines produced and often run by the technological State. 

            Having already examined the characters of James Bond and Luke Sky­walker in some detail, it is worth considering them together here.  The pair represents two kinds of accommodation with the technological State.  In a high-tech world, humans and increasingly complex machines are expected to form strong, constructive working relations and not, as in the nostalgic saga of John Henry, to challenge one another to a contest that can only lead to surrender or death. 

            Bond and Skywalker are adept at bridging the conceptual and affective abyss that constantly threatens to open between us and our silicon-based, gas-guzzling alter egos.  Their talent ushers from a combination of youthful impetuousness and technical expertise, this conjunction of youth and high tech competence having become an accepted part of life in a world where there are still people walking around who were born before a twenty-two-year-old Henry Ford built his first Model A.  As any oldster (meaning those decrepit old fools over forty) can tell you, if you want to program your VCR, figure out your TV remote, or (delusions of grandeur!) actually get your new computer to do something you want it to, call the kid or grandkid.  Bond at the wheel of Q’s miracle car, tossing off witty remarks while conducting a high-speed duel with death, is paced by Skywalker, exclaiming during a pilots’ briefing on the upcoming attack on the Death Star that it will be “just like potting swamp rats in my landspeeder.”  Their levity and charisma demonstrate that the distinctly human qualities of individualism, flair, and humor are compatible with the sober self-restraint required of a technician. 

            Bond and Skywalker thus extend mechanosemiotic representation by per­sonalizing the machine-user while demonstrating the creative uses to which machines lend themselves.  And their personalities are rendered the more vibrant by pitting them against stiff, muscle-bound, “mechanical” opponents: Bond versus Odd Job and Jaws; Skywalker versus the Imperial Guard and its assortment of killer droids. 

            Although Bond and Skywalker in their role as Masters of Machines are cultural heroes of a Dreamtime world, they are sufficiently like you and me to make their personalities felt in the real/reel world (as opposed to the reel/real world of the theatre).  Bond has a job and even an employee identification number.  And Skywalker, if the Ewoks’ party ever ends, will find himself the favored knight of a highly militarized and monarchical society (if not the principal claimant to the throne himself: as the brother of Princess Leia, is Skywalker not a prince?). 

            We have seen that Bond preserves his savoir-faire by joking away his dependence on a government job.  It is quite remarkable that the Bond of the movies is so glib and apolitical, so flippant about the human and social consequences of his deadly activities, for Fleming’s Bond was a true Cold Warrior, constantly worrying about the Russians and brooding over the moral justification for his killings.  The producer Albert Broccoli extricates himself from that character by invoking another Fleming creation, SPECTRE, the international, apolitical criminal conspiracy bent on world domination.  Exit the villainous Russian spy, Rosa Klebb (From Russia with Love), and enter the politically cynical megalomaniacs, Dr. No, Goldfinger, Stromberg, Blofeld, and Katanga.  A dramatic closure of sorts is reached in The Spy Who Loved Me: rather than the sexual bait of Russia, designed to lure Bond into a blackmail plot, the female spy of The Spy who loves 007 is engaged on a joint mission with him under orders from her KGB spymaster (who, incredibly, is portrayed as quite a likeable old duffer in the most recent Bond movies).  Because the story of Bond is rooted in Cold War ideology, Broccoli’s manipulations of Fleming’s novels and Sean Connery’s and Roger Moore’s witticisms succeed only in neutralizing the ideological content of the films; they draw back from any political statement rather than venture out onto that risky ground. 

            Oddly, Star Wars jumps in where the Bond films fear to tread.  Although Lucas insists that the trilogy’s success is due to its fantastic, escapist content, its self-proclaimed fairy tale quality proves to be a license for creating a highly ideological film.  Starting with a clean slate, the formulaic “long ago, in a galaxy far, far away,” Lucas is free to ignore conventional political oppositions (democracy/communism, freedom/servitude) while proposing a new social order  the Empire  founded on the opposition of totalitarian technocracy versus individual technical derring-do.  That opposition happens to be a foundation of American folklore, which helps explain the movie’s remarkable resonance with its audiences: in a bizarre transformation Luke Skywalker appropriates John Henry’s legendary status and carries on the battle against the Company’s machine.  The difference between the black laborer and the blond starship pilot, of course, is that the latter wins (twice, with the destruction of Death Star II) while John Henry dies with the hammer in his hand. 

            Adopting even a sugar-coated ideological position makes a phenomenon with such mass appeal as Star Wars a potent force in the world outside the theatre. And taking a position links Star Wars with other ideological constructs that are themselves mythic.  Like Bond, Luke is David, the archetypal under­dog in an interstellar, high-tech showdown with that futuristic Goliath, Darth Vader and the Death Star.  Closer to home, the trilogy is an almost trans­parent overlay on an extensive folklore of youthful American revolutionaries struggling against the repressive juggernaut of the evil King George and his contemptible, mindless Hessian mercenaries (who, however, wore red coats rather than the white armor of the Imperial Guard).  And still closer, Luke’s battles evoke the spirit and inventiveness of young American soldiers in the face of the war machines (appropriate phrase!) of Hitler and Hirohito.  In the minds of twelve year-olds fresh from truly mythic experiences in their Ameri­can History classes, Luke and Han are unconsciously ranked with George Washington, Paul Revere, and the inevitable young soldier of John Wayne’s old war movies (although he usually gets plugged toward the end of the second reel).  Recalling Lucas’s first hit, Star Wars might have been titled American Graffiti II

            The escapist fare Lucas claims to provide to a fantasy-starved nation is much more ideological than the politically laundered Bond movies, which give up on good guy and bad guy sides altogether and concentrate on the dramatic doings of the individual hero.  Star Wars ideology, however, is far more wistful than sinister.  What message do the three movies communicate to young viewers, that they can carry with them into  the world outside the theatre?  Not, I think, that the enemy (Russia? China? Iran? Iraq?  you fill in the blank), are inhuman fiends who deserve to be exterminated; Star Wars may be ideological, but it is not blatantly xenophobic.

            The trilogy’s message is rather a curious mix of nostalgia and fantasy: there are bad people out there who control big, bad machines and who want to hurt us, but there are also a few good, very clever people who stand ready to use their technological skills to defend us against the powerful, big-machine-wielding oppressors.  An extremely simple reading of a simple tale, this interpretation identifies what I take to be the ideological appeal of the trilogy.  It also shows that the media’s use of the “Star Wars” sobriquet to describe Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative is accurate only to the extent that it arouses in the TV viewer or newspaper reader the dread we feel whenever the Death Star makes its appearance in the cinematic Star Wars.  Reagan’s proposed system would have removed the last vestige of human control over instruments of global aggression, thereby moving the Earth closer to becoming the Empire.  The media slogan is inaccurate, however, in that it raises the false hope that the message of the cinematic version will be fulfilled, and a flesh and blood Skywalker materialize to keep the generals’ space weapons in check (even those whippersnappers Bill Clinton and Al Gore will not satisfy that forlorn hope).

            Far from being a superficial endorsement of American military might, Star Wars is anti-nuke, anti-big, and just plain anti-Establishment.  While the movie glorifies high-tech combat, its focus is always on the individual talent of the young hero, which he possesses as an innate attribute of one in whom, as Vader says, “the Force is strong.”  If direct parallels between our Dreamtime myth and social institutions are to be drawn, then one might relate the immense popularity of Star Wars during the period 1977–83 to the renewed fear of nuclear war or accident among American and European youth and to their commitment to religious causes and movements that stress the promi­nence of individual experience over institutional affiliation.  Luke Skywalker speaks, indirectly, to the kids who blocked the entrance to the Diablo Canyon reactor or who participate in one or other of the new “charismatic” cults. 

            The ideological significance of Skywalker’s and Bond’s adventures is couched in the Dreamtime idiom of a mechanosemiotic system of representa­tion.  That system has as its object the elucidation of the continually changing relationship between humans and machines.  The stories of John Henry, Bond, and Skywalker are neither carbon copies  drab, functionalist reiterations of a social reality constituted from some other, decidedly non-Dreamtime source  nor utterly novel fabrications; they are intermeshed transformations of one another, combining and contradicting to form a complex set of virtual ex­periences.  The play of transformations, however, is not random: On the eve of the twenty-first century humans and machines enjoy a qualitatively different form of coexistence from that of a century or even a few decades ago.  It is the serious task of our unserious movies to chart the course of change in our relations with machines, and so we may expect to find something of a history, which necessarily includes a vision of the future, in the complex set of elements and themes that make up the transformations of our medialogiques

            The most important process here (one hesitates to call it a “progression”) is the increasing interdependence, to the point of shared identity, of humans and machines.  While John Henry, James Bond, and Luke Skywalker all take on some variant of the Company’s (State’s) machine, they incur different debts to other, different sorts of machines in the process.  The story of John Henry valorizes and naturalizes a manual  implement: he was “born with a hammer in his hand,” and that hammer remained a physical extension of his body as he built his legend of the “steel-drivin’ man.” 

            This relation constitutes an elementary bionic process: it is the melding of human hand and inanimate artifact that began over two million years ago, when australopithecines first hefted the crude pebble choppers they had fashioned from the lava rock of East Africa.    Those implements  the first machines  became an integral part of an elementary cyborganic or mechano­semiotic system responsible in large measure for subsequent evolutionary changes in hominid hand structure and, most importantly, brain size.  The great antiquity of that system reminds us that we didn’t invent tools: tools were being used and were modifying the physical and mental structures of their users two million years before “we” modern Homo sapiens appeared on the scene.  It would be much nearer the truth to say that tools invented people. 

            James Bond prefers gadgets to the nostalgic hammer, but despite their technological sophistication these are as anonymous and disposable as John Henry’s tool (note that the folk song refers to it as a and not the hammer).  Even Bond’s miracle car, a machine intimately personalized by countless teenagers over the decades, remains free of any personal familiarity or patina of use.  It is merely a high-tech toy to be cast aside when the mission is completed (and eagerly so: we want to see the next batch of goodies from Q’s lab).  That eagerness, of course, represents a significant departure from the story of John Henry and the cyborganic system it represents, for with Bond machines have become objects of interest and desire in their own right.  No one really cares about John Henry’s hammer as an object, but Bond’s toys help to perpetuate a dominant pattern of consumerism in contemporary culture.  They are objects in what amounts to a pornography of the machine, an ob­session with its physical form and movements and a consuming desire for ever changing, sensually exciting experiences with it.

            We have seen that Luke Skywalker carries the ages-old mechanosemiotic system a step further than Bond: his favorite machine, R2D2, is much more than a disposable toy; it is a major personality in the trilogy.  To lapse into Calspeak, Luke enjoys a Meaningful Relationship versus Bond’s carnal inter­ludes.  The theme of the machine as friend and lover does not, however, capture the full meaning of Luke and R2D2’s relationship (or Relationship).  Luke does not direct R2D2 as John Henry does his hammer or Bond his Lotus; he enters into a partnership with it. 

            With himself as senior partner (Terminator 2, in which the Arnie-machine takes control, was still a few years in the mechanosemiotic future), Luke takes the pilot’s seat in the fighter craft while R2D2 serves as his copilot.  Their cooperation is such that one is led to wonder (in a mechanosemiotic vein) what separates their respective competences in doing battle with the Death Star and the Empire’s minions.  The actual attack sequence on the Death Star in the first movie is highly instructive here: a close examination of it tells much about the Dreamtime course of human-machine representations in future cultural productions (such as Terminator). 

            The dazzling attack scene, which consumes all of three minutes, incorpo­rates four critical events or elements: (1) R2D2 is “injured” and forced to abandon its tasks as copilot; (2) when all appears lost, the ghostly voice of Obe Wan Kenobi urges Luke to surrender his rational, expert control over the ship and allow the Force to guide him to his target; (3) that target, the nuclear reactor that powers the Death Star, is never shown in the world-out-there, but is always depicted in computer graphics on the monitor in Luke’s console; (4) the scene contains at least sixty cuts, one every three seconds, which made it a likely candidate (in the relatively easy going era of the late seventies) for the most action-packed sequence in film. 

            R2D2’s “injury,” Luke’s unsuccessful effort to complete the mission on his own, and the ghostly presence of the Force together frame a major proposition in contemporary moral discourse: God is on the side not of the big battalions, but of the individual who possesses an uncanny, inspired control over his machine.  That control can be won only through a Zen-like technique of abandoning conscious, deliberate thought and allowing the situation and the machine’s instruments to fuse into a single, concerted action that flows from the unconscious.  Though she might not have expressed it in just these terms, I believe that is precisely Brenda Howard’s meaning in saying she felt “just like a machine” while bowling two straight 300 games (see the introductory quotation to Chapter 4).  We have heard of Zen archery; Star Wars is Zen rocketry (and now Brenda Howard brings us Zen bowling). 

            When Luke yields to the voice of Obe Wan Kenobi, he does not take his hands off the instruments and let divine intervention take its course.  Instead, he continues to operate the ship, but now with a mastery of the machine that is a synthesis of  human, machine, and divinity.  And this synthesis is more than a dramatic effect: since it enables Luke to destroy one world order and pave the way for another, it is the crucial element in the origin myth of a post-Empire civilization.  The individual merges with the machine in a divinely inspired act to defeat the totalitarian, mechanized State; this is the kernel of the three minutes of cinematic Dreamtime served up in the attack sequence. 

            The third and fourth elements of the attack sequence have to do with the mode, rather than content, of the action.  They are nonetheless at least as significant as the human-machine-divinity synthesis in charting the future of culture.  The many cuts Lucas employs in the sequence guarantee that it will be perceived as action-packed adventure, but what kind of adventure actually occurs?  It is the adventure of the computer monitor, in its then novel and phenomenally popular manifestation: the video game.  Luke, with R2D2 look­ing over his shoulder and the Force guiding his fingers, is confronted with an image of the maze-way leading to the reactor and with numerous video blips representing enemy ships. His task, with the future of humanity riding on the outcome, is to operate his joystick control so that he penetrates to the heart of the maze and gets the enemy blips before they get him.  The scene (with considerably lower stakes: the right to “engrave” ones initials in video on the list of top scores rather than become savior of the world) is played out tens of thousands of times a day in the video arcades of our malls, bars, and airport lounges. 

            John Henry valorized the manual labor of a young, vigorous America just facing up to the implications of industrialization.  James Bond personifies the obsession and  expertise with consumer toys characteristic of our disintegrating industrial society.  Luke Skywalker represents the other face of that dis­integration, the next fleck of Dreamtime froth, in which human flesh and blood and high-tech electronics are melded to form the cyborganic hero of a dawning era, a Something Else whose contours are already dimly visible through the straining membrane of the present.  Luke is the video wizard, master of arcade machines, both priest and prophet of a social phenomenon Star Wars helped create and to which it gave some of its most popular amusements. 

            One Dreamtime element points to another.  A movie series reviled for its superficiality, but conveying important truths to those who examine it closely, feeds into a popular amusement denounced for its mindlessness.  Are video arcades simply the pool halls of a new generation (and were pool halls ever “simply” pool halls, devoid of any mythic signification in a Dreamtime world?) or do they carry an important message for cultural analysis?  Everything that has preceded this makes it obvious that I am inclined toward the latter possibility: any cultural phenomenon as splashy as video games must be linked in some fundamental way with the culture of which it is a (generative) part.  Following up this hunch (or bias) necessitates a brief sojourn outside the movie theatre into the video arcade, Temple of the Technological State.  That sojourn, from one carnivalesque site to another, will lead in its circuitous fashion back into the movies, only this time into the domain of one of the successors of James Bond and Luke Skywalker: Indiana Jones.

            For anyone over, say, fifteen, a first experience with a video arcade can be devastating.  To virtually every adult sensibility it is bedlam gone modern.  The arcade is a blur of light, motion, and sound (but don’t look for any printed instructions to help you through this brush up against The Membrane).  And sound may be the key to the whole experience. 

            Try this experiment in cultural analysis.  A novice to arcades, you enter an arcade with a friend.  The two of you select an unattended machine and, while your friend plays and you pretend to watch, you close your eyes.  You are now standing stock-still in the midst of the most incredible noise.  Beeps, booms, toots, whistles, and chitterings from everywhere in the audible register come at you from every side, the products of dozens of synthesizers tortured unmerci­fully by the anonymous madmen who fabricated the games.  In addition to the electronic scramble, you also hear the shuffling of the arcade crowd: thighs bumping against metal cabinets (more machine porn!); wrists being shaken into pre-arthritic seizures by joysticks; bill-changers dispensing an endless flow of the new casino money, “tokens.”

            Listen to those sounds of bedlam for a few minutes (a very few, for you will probably find that time has a way of passing slowly under these circumstances), then open your eyes and leave the arcade immediately (the visual effects can wait for another visit), and find a quiet place where you can think about what you have heard. 

            If you are willing to grant the total effect of the arcade noises any sense whatsoever, that is, if they seem to be part of a cultural production and not a random grating of organic and mechanical parts, then the possibility presents itself that these sounds belong to a new order of experience.  They may be part of a new language, or, since the term “language” is burdened with too many proprietary rights (stridently claimed by a diverse bunch that includes linguists, other assorted academics, grade school English teachers, a newspaper colum­nist here and there, and others), perhaps it would be better to say a new system of representation or signification (that way only semioticians and a few philosophers will get lathered up about associating the bedlam of arcades with the principles of meaning).  Until a few years ago, noises like those you listened to in the arcade were heard only in the most esoteric places: elec­tronics laboratories, recording studios, or, in the most domestic case, the home of the occasional hi-fi hobbyist.  Now they flood our lives: a trip to the supermarket, a bored stroll around the airport, a drink in a bar.  None of these everyday events is free of the electronic voice of the new generation of interactive machines. 

            While reflecting on the implications of your arcade experiment, comple­ment it with another, somewhat  more demanding investigation in the field of modern aural productions.  Go down to that friendly neighborhood Block­buster video store and rent a copy of Star Wars.  Back at home, pop the tape into your VCR, crank up the audio so it definitely has your attention (and we won’t even entertain the possibility that your system doesn’t have stereo capability), then sit back with your eyes closed through as much of the movie as you can manage without real discomfort.  By all means, however, be sure to close your eyes when the attack sequence on the Death Star begins.  Depriving yourself of the fast-paced, circus-like visual imagery of the film allows you to concentrate on the true strangeness of its communicative exchanges (to use as general and unbiased a term as possible).  This experiment allows you actually to hear some of the mechanosemiotic representations described earlier and, hopefully, appreciate the broad range of significative functions which sounds that are part of no human language acquire in Star Wars

            The engrossing (or not!) aural sensations of our little experiment pay an extra dividend: they provide direct confirmation of the similarities between Star Wars, particularly the attack sequence, and the countless SuperNintendo and Genesis video games that clutter our homes and the minds of our children.  Luke’s mission is not merely like playing a video game, it is the sensory equivalent of an arcade experience (only with a game so sophisticated that it would demand pockets full of “Replay Only” tokens before you could activate the controls of your arcade starfighter).

            In the world outside the theatre, Luke’s mastery of video games points the way to a close analysis of their significative function in society.  In particular, his Dreamtime mastery of video game machines offers a clue to the cultural construction of his successor, Indiana Jones.  The immense popularity of video games helps to explain Lucas’s apparently sharp departure, in Raiders of the Lost Ark and Indiana Jones in the Temple of Doom, from his formula for success in the Star Wars trilogy.  How is it that Lucas and the movie-going masses switched from space opera to swashbuckling adventure in one fell swoop?  In answering this question we could resort to the usual jibes our social commentators inflict on popular culture: artists are continually trying something new just for the sake of novelty; the popular mind is a fickle beast; content is irrelevant because every supergrosser resorts to the same lurid sensationalism to win box office. 

            Such knee-jerk attempts at providing an “explanation” for the thematic direction of popular movies are really efforts to dismiss the very possibility that those light-hearted productions may generate culture at a fundamental level.  Besides offering the tautological solution that things happen because they happen, that one movie follows another willy-nilly, these dismissive critiques serve a major ideological function: they buttress up the comfortable old humanism’s ptolemaic conception of humanity by embracing the conventional wisdom that people are fixedly and inviolably people, who may go out and do various quaint things with machines, even extremely complex machines, but who retain a basic, unchanged “human nature” from start to finish.  “Men operate machines” is the simple credo of this centuries-old perspective on the mechanosemiosis of the species; they do not generate experience with machines, and they are certainly not operated by machines.  Whether the “man” in ques­tion picks up a pebble chopper, an Acheulian hand ax, a hoe or a laser (or even fires up one of the SuperNintendo sets lying around the house for a stimulating game of Mortal Kombat), it is all the same, timeless routine of a fixed and self-determined humanity doing things with extraneous, lifeless artifacts.  

            The mythic processes that drive cultural generativity and that lead from John Henry through Bond and Skywalker fly in the face of the old humanism, comforting though it has been.  The established and complacent view of ourselves, which has succeeded only by keeping “myth” neatly walled off from “reality” here gives way to the concept of a rootless humanity, perpetually in flux, a virtual (quasi)species that can exist at all only by continually negating and affirming its integral ties to animals and machines, kin and enemy, benevolent and malevolent forces. 

            Indiana Jones, of all characters (cardboard cut-out that he is), advances this new concept of humanity, but in a most curious fashion.  For at first glance, Indy seems to represent a nostalgic step back into an earlier, simpler time, when our matinee heroes were cowboys and buccaneers, real swashbuckling men of action.  He does not brandish a light saber or even a Beretta auto­matic, but relies instead on his trusty bullwhip (shades of Lash Larue, if anyone remembers him) and Wild West-style six-shooter (Wild Bill Hickock rides again).  So is Indy an old-fashioned, or at least retro kind of guy?  Hardly. 

            If Luke Skywalker transformed the traditional action-hero into a video game wizard, Indiana Jones takes us one more step down the road (or through another of those frothy membranes) of the mechanosemiotic process through which humanity is continuously redefined.  Fast-paced and high tech as the action in Star Wars is, it is still strung along the line of a discernible plot and it still features a hero with a human past and problems that evoke a certain recognition and even empathy from the audience.  But with Indiana Jones, the already fast-paced plot of Star Wars is kicked into warp drive, redlined past the point where it makes much sense to speak of “plot” or “character development” anymore.  With Luke we still had the impression of a (very talented) individual doing things with machines; Indy’s character and the frenetic pace of his adventures make it all but impossible to see him as much more than an ani­mated figure in a SuperNintendo game himself, and clearly impossible to attach much importance to the “plot” of Raiders or Temple.

            For not only is Indy not a retro kind of guy, he is hardly a guy at all,  being more a Pac Man or Mortal Kombat animated video image than a photo­graphed person.  In his disjointedness (might we say “fractalness”?) Indy disperses the few remaining traces Luke left us of the traditional hero whose life is filled with the drama of conflicting ideals, desires, and social institutions.  Indy is not so much an acted character as a reactive one.

            As a video image in what amounts to a super-SuperNintendo set with a power of resolution that is still a few years away (at the most), Indiana Jones installs the pace and format of the video game within the domain of human action.  In other words, the people-images on video game sets become suf­ficiently life-like to duplicate the actions of human actors in a movie (the movie Looker takes this device a giant step farther, with computer-generated video images replacing ostensibly “real” people such as presidents).  The video game, however, retains its frenetic, joystick-slapping format, so that the action scenes in Raiders of the Lost Ark and Temple of Doom have one death-defying stunt following another. 

            Mere human behavior, even James Bond’s most slapdash antics, appears pedestrian by comparison; Bond becomes the slow-walking, slow-talking old coot who is shoved aside by the homeboys slamming to rap music on their Sony Diskmans.  The old-fashioned notion of motivated, goal-directed human action withers away before the rappers’ onslaught, with the result that Indy’s frenzied actions have no point apart from their sheer dynamism.  Hence the transparent quality of the story that passes as plot in both Raiders and Temple: Indy sets out to recover some priceless treasure that possesses a vaguely religious as well as monetary value.  Accomplishing that end involves him in one scene after another that is a cinematic explosion, comprising a tremendous number of cuts.  The result is that an entire Indiana Jones movie proceeds at the breakneck pace of the three-minute attack sequence in Star Wars.

            Increasing the tempo in this fashion does more than just provoke a corres­ponding increase in our blood pressure (those fibrillating old hearts again!).  The transition from Bond and Skywalker to Indiana Jones breaks a barrier, crosses over one of those infinitely complex lines we have been considering throughout this work.  That barrier, or some ragged stretch of it, is nothing less than what separates one form of humanity from another, or, just perhaps, humanity from Something Else. 

            Indiana Jones, then, is the next phase (or phase space) of a Star Wars-inspired culture.  The video arcade and SuperNintendo set in your living room now become the new temples of the technological State, supplanting the in­creasingly nostalgic Dreamtime temple of the movie theatre.  Indy’s boyish folksiness and old-fashioned tastes in weapons are not signs that the pendulum of cultural change has swung back in the direction of an earlier, bucolic, normal time.  Quite the opposite.  The fusion of a down-home character with video arcade imagery and format is another indication that the cultural rug has well and truly been yanked from beneath our feet, that we are not so much entering the next millenium as plunging into it in free fall. 

            The truth that this close examination of Star Wars and Indiana Jones movies reveals is that there is no “normal life,” no “real world” to which we can return after exiting the theatre, leaving the arcade, or simply breaking off one of our daily reveries (reveal-eries).  Materialist or idealist, pragmatist or dreamer, the distinctions of -ism labels fall away when put in the context of several million years of a mechanosemiotic process, a dynamic system of representations which spews out images and identities like some cerebral supernova.  Those images and identities (ever-so purposeful plural here!) set the parameters of that twisting, turning, many-tendriled quasispecies it pleases us to call “humanity.”

 

Gone to Look for (Post-Literate) America

            So where, then, were those kids in my Burlington, Vermont, bookstore heading when they exited into a world whose conceptual boundaries and cinematic representations are undergoing such rapid change?  Where will their bookless bookmarks of Luke, Han, and Jabba take them, and what kinds of meanings will they “read” into their experiences along the way? 

            In concluding with a few general remarks about the dynamics of the human-machine relationship, what I have called the mechanosemiotic system of representations, the greatest obstacle I face is the extent to which that topic has already been taken up by the reportorial media and seemingly sucked dry of its implications.  “Post-literacy,” the “computer age,” and “biotechnology,” with its specter of cyborganic men and women, are all notions most of us are bombarded with from the first cup of decaffeinated coffee and the morning paper to our Nyquil and the late evening news.  I realize it is asking a lot, but I would urge you to try to put all that out of your minds for the time being, and to concentrate on what seem to be the underlying elements in this sodden mass of news about the impact of machines on our lives. 

            The most misleading aspect of all the reportorial hype is that it is presented as news: we are constantly served up shrill, breathless accounts of something dramatically new that is happening to alter our lives (and that thus deserves to count as “news”).  This outlook, which inspires stacks of magazine articles, TV documentaries, and books (and the advertising dollars to back them up), misses the absolutely fundamental point that computers, biotechnology, and other gimmicky tokens of (post)modernity are an integral part of a set of cultural processes that are as old as the hills (and a good deal older than many of the quake-created hills around Hollywood).  In fact, the cultural processes of what, for want of a longer word, I have been calling “mechanosemiosis,” are a great deal older than humanity, since those processes were an indispensable part of its birthing.  The hue and cry over “post-literacy”  our kids in the bookstore, Johnny can’t read (or write, or count), the educational system is a shambles  must be put in that context.

            Recall that the Sumerians introduced the first Western system of writing about five thousand years ago, mere instants on the time scale of hominid evolution.  To get where we are today involved millions of years of sentient, tool-making, communicative action by individuals who had not the faintest glimmer of writing.  So why make such a fuss about an item in our contem­porary cultural repertoire that appeared a relatively short time ago, has transmuted beyond recognition during its brief history (from Sumerian scratchings on clay tablets through monastic scrolls and Gutenberg plates to word-processor programs), and now gives every indication of lapsing back into the specialized activity of a group of scribes who doodle away while most of us . . . do Something Else.  After all, the news stories are accurate as far as they go: an increasing number of Johnnys can’t read (the last survey I remember seeing pegged functional illiteracy among adults in the United States at around thirty percent).  Our genus, Homo, has been non-literate through so much of its (not “his,” or even “hers and his”) history, why should we now gawp and shake our heads when reporters train their myopic gaze on early indications of its incipient post-literacy?  What is the big deal about reading and writing? 

            Considering its brief and unstable history, it seems more accurate to regard writing as derivative of other cultural processes than to treat that specialized facility as an indispensable condition of our humanity.  The generativity of animals and machines, of group membership and exclusion, and of the creative and destructive forces of nature can be given expression without the use of writing.  The history of our species, Homo sapiens, is largely a collection of just such non-literate expressions: the Paleolithic cave drawings of Lascaux; the innumerable iconic and abstract artifacts of “primitive” peoples; the institutions of warfare and tourism; and all our monuments, shrines, and cathedrals.  If semiotic or semiological approaches to culture have tended to place (a nar­rowly conceived) narrative and language, and almost always written language, at the heart of their theoretical concerns, it is because those approaches have typically taken root and flourished in university departments of comparative literature, languages, and philosophy (Roland Barthes’ semiology being a prominent example).  In those cloistered settings Olduvan tool kits, Paleolithic drawings, family life, and race relations are not on everyone’s mind (and surely not in everyone’s dissertation).  Anthropological semiotics or cultural analysis as done by anthropologists, however, cannot afford the luxury of the narrow, “cultured” definition of the subject matter of other disciplines.  It is simply impossible for an anthropological theory of culture to ignore the fact that an artifactual intelligence  a tool-making consciousness  has been around a lot longer than writers have. 

            The final lesson of the Star Wars trilogy and of the little episode in my bookstore is that the cultural processes involved in generating humanity through its relations with machines  mechanosemiosis  is an endless sorting through and rearranging of the meaningful properties of artifacts.  Implements, shelters, clothes, as well as the generic “machines” that have come to embody artifactual activity over the last century, all these items of “material culture” once dismissed as lifeless and relegated to the museologist’s shelves are the elemental stuff of an emerging anthropological semiotics.  In that inventory of artifacts, writing, with all its chameleon-like properties, is one of several particularly intriguing entries.  It is not, however, what impelled tens of millions of Star Wars viewers through the theatre turnstiles or what motivated the bookstore kids to buy their Jedi bookmarks.  The movies, the bookmarks, the R2D2 toys, the Darth Vader masks, even the Return of the Jedi Storybook are the productions of an intelligence that never forgets its debt to the synthesis of eye, hand, and object, to the world of artifacts, of which humanity itself is a principal inhabitant.  

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Lee's analysis of Star Wars is compelling. The points that leap out at me as a fan of the series are the observations (1) that the characterization of machines is much richer than that of the human beings and (2) that when Luke and Darth Vader are finally reconciled they  are both cyborgs. But what are the implications of these findings?

I suggest that it might be interesting to complicate Lee's analysis with observations and arguments from two additional sources.  The first is Donna Harraway's classic essay "The Cyborg Manifesto" (a PDF can be found here). The second is a book I now have in my Kindle library,  P. W. Singer's Wired for WarI am thinking in particular of the chapter on the relationship of science fiction to the military-industrial complex, where Singer points out that most science fiction is about wars and that much of hard science fiction is written by scientists and engineers, who are also frequently recruited for DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and other defense-related think tanks. We are talking of people for whom the Death Star and R2D2 are not only symbols that embody primordial conflicts, but potentially feasible projects.

 

John,

    Thanks very much for your comments.  You’re right to suggest a comparison of the essay with Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto.”  I think the important similarity between the two is that both works argue for a dissolution of the boundary between nature and culture.  Going with that premise then reveals the mistaken bent of most popular conceptions of the cyborg as strictly (an often fiendish) product of modern technology.  I have two problems with Haraway here.  First, I’ve always found her writing difficult to the point of opaqueness; I know things are complicated but is it really necessary to write about them in such a difficult style?  Second, her cyborg is very much a (post)modern creation of late 20th century thought: The idea precipitates out from a thick mixture of socialism, feminism, literary theory.  I like to think mine is a more anthropological perspective.  I’d argue that cyborgs have been around for a long, long time, say three million years and counting – from the time that individuals of early Homo lineages (note: not yet human) developed the skill of coordinating eye, hand, and object to fashion artifacts (first of wood and bone, then later stone).   Cyborgs are not a last-minute product of modern technology; “We” were cyborgs long before becoming human. 

    Also, I think it’s important to emphasize that the human-machine relationship has undergone fundamental changes in the past century.  This is the general phenomenon of future or techno-shock that every commentator under the sun goes on about.  That’s why movies like the Star Wars saga, Terminator, and Avatar have such tremendous appeal.  The genius of those movies is that they entertain while engaging their audiences in some deep, soul-searching issues.  The question for cultural analysis, which I attempt to answer in the essay, is how specifically the changing human-machine relationship is articulated, represented, internalized by the masses of people who flock to the movies.   

[Edited Version]

Lee,

I am a bit more forgiving when it comes to Harraway's style. In your more straightforward style I recognize a manly tone, a confidence that your words will say exactly what you want them to mean. One of the issues Harraway addresses is that, from a feminist perspective, the very language that those in our generation were taught is clear and compelling embodies a male perspective and assumes that what men say and the ways in which they say it are correct and superior. Thus, women who wish to be recognized as equals must speak and write as men do. 

I do not, however, want to have us distracted by questions of literary style per se. I am far more interested in the possibility that what both Harraway and Drummond argue for, that "dissolution of the boundary between nature and culture" may elicit a variety of responses. Some of the differences may be due to gender. Others may be due to generation. Race, ethnicity, and religion may also come into play. 

Let me focus, for a moment, on generation. I think about my wife and my daughter. To my wife, who belongs to the same generation as Harraway, equality for women implied that gender should be irrelevant and women judged solely as individuals. To my daughter being accepted as an individual includes acceptance of gender. A woman can be as capable as a man in doing what men do (flying aircraft, surviving SERE  school, working for a government contractor) while remaining free to pursue traditionally feminine interests(food and fashion, for example). Their issue is that when they do what men do, assert authority and speak up strongly for things that they believe in, they are regarded not as equals doing what leaders do but as "bitchy" and unfeminine. 

Returning to the movies, then, I wonder about that opening scene in 2001 a Space Odyssey in which an ape-like creature picks up a rock and wonder why it wasn't a digging stick. I also wonder what you make of the latest Star Wars movie, in which Luke's role is reprised by a woman (women can now, it appears,become Jedi knights) and the Hans Solo replacement is a black man who discards his imperial stormtrooper's armor and turns out not to have been a robot after all.

Also,on a different tangent, I am not entirely persuaded by the equation animal + tool=man=cyborg argument. A man can put down or lose a tool and remain a man. When Darth Vader's helmet is removed, he dies.

 

Lucid writing a male prerogative?  I really hope not.  But if so, who will tell Camille Paglia, Rebecca Goldstein, Ruth Behar  . . .? 

 

Lee,

Lucid writing is not a male prerogative. But what is taken to be lucid writing may be shot full of assumptions, and those who challenge those assumptions may create awful tangles as they try to challenge those assumptions, in how as well as what they write. That is why I find myself only "a bit more forgiving." At the end of the day, however, snark about style is a red herring. 

What about the substantive questions I raise: (1) what happens to the story when Luke is replaced by a woman and what was inside the stormtrooper's armor turns out to have been a black man? And (2) is a human being equipped with a tool ipso facto a cyborg? There are cases in which a tool or weapon is described as wielded as if it were a natural extension of the individual who wields it. Erasing the boundary between self and sword or tennis racket is something extraordinarily talented people are sometimes said to be able to do. As anthropologists we are, moreover, likely to be aware of Gregory Bateson's musings about the relationship of the blind man to his stick. In all of these cases, the removal of the tool or weapon leaves the human animal intact. When Vader's helmet is removed, he dies. That seems a bit different to me.

Have you, by the way, read any of the Bruce Sterling stories set in his "Mechanists and Shapers" universe? The Mechanists replace as much biology as possible with hardware. The Shapers genetically reengineer the body to endow it with new, biologically based, powers. Are they both cyborgs?

Those unfamiliar with Harraway and wanting a brief introduction should see the following interview in Wired magazine. http://www.wired.com/1997/02/ffharaway/

I believe the bubble in Danish reads something like 'This is so unrealistic! Why don't we go to the movies and watch Star Wars'.

Has our conversation ended before it was even well begun? I certainly hope not. Perhaps we need to discuss what can be done with a lucid, insightful, I would even go so far as brilliant piece of writing.

Approach 1. That's cool. Let's move on. Nothing more to be learned here.

Approach 2. Adopt that conceptual framework, here Lee's semiospace, and "apply" it to different material. Gee whiz, it works here, too.

Approach 3. How can we develop these ideas? Are there opportunities here to improve the conceptual framework? Does new data suggest new directions?

Note: The goal is not to reject or replace the framework but to look for possible improvements. To use a favorite example, Kepler does not reject Copernicus. Newton does not replace Kepler. Einstein develops a better theory but does not deny that the solar system is heliocentric, the earth's orbit elliptical, and the law of gravity explains why. Why can't anthropology work the same way, building on great ideas in pursuit of even better ones?

In the case at hand, the Star Wars franchise, we have a remarkable opportunity for close comparison with a temporal dimension. Fans' complaints that Star Wars, the Force Awakens follows too closely the original Star Wars plot line point to an opportunity to assess the impact of new elements in the mythology, a female Jedi, an AWOL storm trooper played by a black actor, a smaller, rounder, cuter robot sidekick, to note just a few.

Lee's argument that blockbuster movies are modern mythology still stands. The Force Awakens has been the most profitable Star Wars film ever.

Lots to talk about here.

 

John,

   You’ve laid out precisely where I hoped this discussion might go: 

In the case at hand, the Star Wars franchise, we have a remarkable opportunity for close comparison with a temporal dimension. Fans' complaints that Star Wars, the Force Awakens follows too closely the original Star Wars plot line point to an opportunity to assess the impact of new elements in the mythology, a female Jedi, an AWOL storm trooper played by a black actor, a smaller, rounder, cuter robot sidekick, to note just a few.

   I thank you for the complimentary words you’ve used to describe the essay, but you did leave out one, not at all complimentary adjective:  old, as in dated.  Dreamtime was published in 1996, while the first three Star Wars movies – the classic trilogy of SW, ESB, RJ – appeared during the period 1977 – 1983.  In the meantime technology – meaning the human-machine relationship – has changed in ways unforeseen and unforeseeable back then.  So the acid test for cultural analysis is to examine the reel-real synthesis in The Force Awakens, with an eye to how the movie and social life mutually inform.  You’ve already touched on significant differences: the protagonist is female; she is involved in a quasi-romance with a black man who defected from the Guard; the Guard is human rather than droid; R2D2’s character is replaced by a pint-sized, skittery droid.  What else is going on?  Does the virtual world depicted in Force resonate with 21st century life?  I have a couple of (still very provisional) ideas here, but I’d be very interested to see what other OAC readers make of the movie’s social-cultural relevance.  Or if they’re ready to dismiss it out of hand as just more meaningless entertainment from Hollywood. But because the movie has become part of the experience of tens of millions of people, I think the question is worth pursuing.  So, you out there, any thoughts on the subject? 

 

Lee,

According to my iPad, seventeen hours have passed since your last post. A snarky part of me suggests that our colleagues and lurkers are more interesting in talking *about* anthropology than in actually *doing* anthropology. Then, however, a more generous thought intrudes. I myself was just coming to grips with the fact that I have not yet seen Star Wars: The Force Awakens. How, then, I was asking myself, could I participate in a discussion for which knowledge of details is essential. Then, a Google search for "Star Wars force awakens" led me to, yes, the name is real, Wookipedia: http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Star_Wars:_Episode_VII_The_Force_Awa... , which is full of interesting details.

Thus, for example, instead of the story of a virtuous young man rebelling against an evil father, we have an evil young man who kills his virtuous father, one of the heroes in the original films. Like his grandfather, he has turned to the dark side. That said, he utterly lacks Darth Vader's gravitas, or, it occurs to me, what we might call his mechanical stoicism. Instead, while he has magical powers, the kid is a punk. He responds to bad news with temper tantrums. I note, too, that he is only dressing up to look like Vader. When he removes his mask, an unmodified human head appears. Which brings me to something overlooked by film critics (at least as far as I can see) but central to the Drummond analysis of the original series. The cyborg combination of human and machine is no longer a central element. No, that's wrong. It has disappeared. This appears, moreover, to be part of a general downplaying of the rich characterization and fetishistic focus on machines in the original series. Yes, there is a droid. But it's smaller, cuter, with a much reduced role compared to R2D2. As in much of science fiction in the last few decades hard SF speculation about future technologies and their implications has been replaced by fantasy with female superheroes endowed with magical powers. The Oedipal struggles of a young man with a father who resembles and is, in fact, partly a machine has been replaced with a story centered on a geek girl, an orphan whose martial arts skills and intimate knowledge of technology, to which magical powers are added, enable her to defeat the loutish or immature males who try to push her around.

Lots to think about here.

Hmm. I think there may be a problem here that people dropping in simply don't know where to start with this or how to respond--I wonder if it needs to have an introduction setting out the problem the paper is responding to.

I have to admit something. I personally struggle with Star Wars, because over the years people have tried to convince me that it is fascinating on a variety of counts, but I must have some kind of film viewers equivalent of colour blindness, because I fell asleep in the first one when it came out in the UK in, I think it was, 1977. since then I have been dragged to all of the Star Wars films. I quite enjoyed the recent JJ Abrams effort because it develops the bits of the first films that struck me at the time as most promising like the lo tech/hi tech scenes on Tatooine--but then I was told that this film is principally liked by people who don't truly appreciate the first films. All this is a sign of my failure to do the anthropology of Star Wars--after all, my liking or not liking a film shouldn't preclude finding something out about it. 

But this is just a preamble to further skepticism. I take the point that Star Wars is much closer to reality in some ways than the word 'escapism' would imply, but I leave the cinema having watched these films and I smile a bit about the well-done effects but the ideas don't stay with me, because there aren't many and the characters are mostly, well irritating, apart from Harrison Ford who has the magical elan necessary ('George, you can type this shitbut you sure has hell can't say it' he is supposed to have said to Lucas). The success here lies in how nothing is touched too deeply, there is a revelling in power and excitement and success--the goodies are never really underdogs, the enemies are undermined by being utterly hidebound by their deeply conventional type of villainy the robots are human all too human dressed up in tin cans. It is obvious that it won't work out for the guys in black just like in a 1950s cowboy movie. OK, a bit of Zen thrown in to give it the tiniest hint of texture. All this translates quite easily, not much mental effort required, it is easy to fill in the pulpy space between the badly developed plot elements, but, in contrast, the design ideas are brilliantly achieved with the space ships all very convincing, the hyperdrive and all that jazz, the beautiful chess set with holographic moving pieces, a great show, I would like to go there, what would that be like?, like going on a day trip to a foreign city with its different street signs and shop fronts, but not really a claim about anything much at all, albeit a reflection of naive optimistic americana--not so evident 40 years later it would seem.

Huon,

As I read what you have written here, I don't hear the voice of an anthropologist responding to Lee's invitation to treat blockbuster films as modern myths. I hear the voice of a native skeptic pointing out that his neighbors's religion is nothing more than superstition and an incoherent mishmash of ideas and attitudes that no sensible person would have the time of day for.

Interestingly your critique builds on the same starting point as Lee's analysis, the contrast in the original Star Wars series between the flat, cartoonish human characters and the the effort required to produce all that exquisite detail in the machines and special effects. Lee explores that difference anthropologically, drawing on ideas suggested by Lévi-Strauss and postulating a "semiosphere" whose three dimensions are defined by oppositions between animal and machine, self and other, and life and death.

Lee's case for treating blockbuster films as modern myths is, I believe, a strong one. Unbelievers like yourself may complain about the simplistic plot and wooden characters—you may even be right. But in the world in which they appeared, these films were not only hugely successful, attracting immense audiences of passionate believers, they also had real world consequences. Remember Ronald Reagan, the "Evil Empire" and the "Star Wars" missle defense system, then Ronald Rumsfeld's mistaken conviction that small numbers of troops equipped with technological superpowers could overthrow evil regimes and usher in peace and democracy throughout the Middle East.

One possible angle on the new film is to reflect on how the world has changed since the fall of the USSR and the elimination of Hussein and Gaddafi have led not to global peace and universal prosperity, the end of history suggested by Samuel Huntington and others, but instead what looks increasingly like the start of a new dark ages once the remaining empire (Oh My God, that's us! Americans and our European and other client states!) collapses.

Lots to think about here, and likely of greater importance in the larger scheme of things than whether, for example, Amazonian tribes believe that jaguars live in villages and perceive blood as manioc beer. Though that, too, is interesting to think about.

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