Structural postmodernism: a contradiction in terms?

[Toby Austin Locke]

This started as a comment on Heesun Hwang’s brilliant blog post ‘What is postmodernism?’ but quickly became far too long, absurd and insubstantial, so I decided it would be better to add as a blog post:

I thought I might add another perspective to the question of the ‘postmodernist’ dilemma, one which has already been partially suggested by some here and elsewhere. It may appear to contradict my previous approach but on close examination I do not consider the two entirely incommensurable.

Perhaps we can see ‘postmodernism’ and ‘poststructuralism’ simply as tangential lines of structuralism. They are just more romanticised, complicated and imaginative. I believe the two systems of thought can be seen as taking the same premises and both are equally born of the same line of western philosophy. In order to develop the methods of ‘postmodern’ thinking, the structures, dichotomies and binary oppositions it deconstructs have been assumed to be in existence. The route of the ‘postmoderns’ has then been to, from this initial piece of predicate information; show them up as overly simplistic. One end of the binary opposition is shown to imply the other. The relation between the concepts has been shown to be more complicated than structuralist modes of thought would suggest. The actuality of reality is shown as more entangled than the theoretical binary distinctions would initially imply. Theory, in reflecting reality, becomes messier and more complex. The simplistic structure which was previously dominant in thought patterns is shown as a human fabrication which does not represent the true nature of reality.

What we are left with is a complex organisation of ideas, concepts and relationships. Objects flow in an irregular manner and intersect one another creating a grand and irregular web of reality found in a variety of spatiotemporal fluctuations. Reality and theory becomes fragmentary but interwoven and not incommensurable. The trails left by such flows become the subject of empirical study as we attempt to make sense of this mess of notions, objects and realities. The web of flows form machines. These machines, the capitalist machine, the nomadic machine interact and engage one another causing affective relationships. The affective flows also create bodies without organs, objects becoming affected and affecting. These bodies without organs engage with machines to create an even greater fragmentary web.

The objects, machines and bodies without organs constitute reality. They engage one another; they interact with and define each other. Flows operate in all directions in a nomadic, unformed and unstable manner creating and affecting singularities. This occurs in a destratified, decoded and deterrtoralized manner, rigid taxonomical structure is escaped and avoided. Stratification is resisted. Multiplicities become from such interactions. They exist on the basis of singularities destratified, irregular and nomadic. They themselves become unstable, irregular and fragmentary. The multiplicities become affective and are affected both in relation to themselves and singularities.

What we see here is a model of reality. It is not a simplistic one based upon dualities engaging simply with one another, but upon a messy web of affective relations. It is a structure of sorts, but not a structuralist one. It is not based upon the relation of x to y but of x affecting y and z and I etc; x’s engagement with y, z, I etc; y’s affective and nomadic position to z, x and I etc; z becoming x, y and I. It is not arborescent for the nature of existence is not. We make existence arborescent with simplistic structure imposed upon reality. The affective relations of entities, bodies without organs and machines could be seen as function just as the web they create could be seen as structure. However, if we impose a dualistic structure upon them, rather than a more complex one, the true meaning and nature of said structure and function is lost. The true relational and affective nature of reality is forced into an prison of dualistic strata.

This web of relations, this machine, flow or body without organs can be seen as structure provided it is a non arborescent, non-binary and non-linear one. It should hold no boundaries. The reason descriptions in terms of structure and function are avoided is because of the images they evoke and the thought patterns the traditional use produces. However provided we can grant a topological application of language I see no reason that such terminology cannot be employed for it does correctly signify the ‘postmodern’ position, provided we grant a little imagination and creativity. So long as we can break away from simplistic and rigid definitions; and provided it does not imply dualism. ‘Postmodern’ reality can be seen through the eyes of structure but not the eyes of a structuralist. If we allow language to define our thought rather than allowing our thoughts to define our use of language this cannot be achieved, but none the less it is not impossible. Furthermore this perspective, argument, position is not a semantic one; provided language is granted the status I suggest: as a plaything of the imagination rather than the owner of.

The position here is not simply that function and structure are to structuralism as affect and machines are to ‘postmodernism’; that would be a semantically meaningless point. Rather the idea being outlined is that both perspectives stem from the same vein of thought, both seek to paint a picture of reality and succeed in doing so.

The structuralist perceive A – B, it locks singularities into layers of redundancy. The unique and beautiful form, and non-form, of nature and reality is lost amid a sea of binary oppositions, functions and structures. Arborescent systems contain, constrict and simplify each occurrence and seek to parallel it to another. Each singularity must be explained in terms of its relation to another, its function within the strata, its position in the structure. A picture of the world is imposed upon reality, it becomes unnaturally ordered, its significance is lost, or at least reduced. Language and structure are allowed to define thought rather than thought running free. Complex, nomadic and rhizomic ideas and perceptions become meaningless or disregarded as merely aesthetic, arborescent, untrue or nonsensical. Structure grips reality and thought, constrains and imprisons it. It is forced into submission and acceptance.

The so called ‘postmodernist’ perceives reality as an entangled mess; a web of affective relations between singularities, multiplicities, bodies without organs, haecceities, spatial relations and temporalities. The flows and permeations engage and affect, interact and create, become and develop. Reality is fragmented, but not incommensurable; it is complex and beautiful. Thought and language do not shape reality they consist of it, become affected by it, flow within it and permeate the strata. A – B is abandoned, such a view would only distort the true nature of existence and reality, it would imprison thought and its subjects, crushing it into a totalised model. Truth is lost and individuation discovered.

The fragmentary perception of reality is as much a part of this affective web as any other entity; it holds its own individuality. Fragmentation becomes a totality, an individuality and a multiplicity, an oxymoron and an absurdity. The ‘postmodern’ perceives a structure but remains unable to explain its complexity; its beauty escapes double articulation and arborescent organisation. Function remains existent but inexplicable by any regime of signs. Only if the topological status of language is permitted in both the mind of the writer and the reader can explanations of reality be achieved. Simplistic structure is lost, the impossibility of expression becomes. ‘Postmodernists’ perceive structure and function but remain unable to explain its existence, or at least unwilling to confine it to such simplistic descriptions, the mode of thought is an arm of structuralism but an unwilling one.

[Alexander Lee]

@Toby

 

If I understand you correctly -- it is great to have more tools in our tool box ;).

 

I would like to add that I'm not so sure that an absolute synthesis can or should be achieved.

 

I think it was in Logic of Sense when Deleuze points out that philosophers have inevitable blind spots as each philosopher's thought works to patch different critical junctures differently.  If this is true, then philosophy is at best a reactive endeavor, something which responds to pre-philosophical semiotic webs that may need justification, explanation, clarification... and I'm not so sure that post-modernism or post-structuralism do a very good job with any of that.  It may be that common everyday individual's lives have always been concerned with more material economics than an abstracted meaning of things, but if anything, most political discourse today echos Heidegger's complaint about values from Introduction to Metaphysics.  Heidegger complained that when Being rises to an idea, the ought in opposition to Being forces a reactive rising of values to the level of Being so that people argue as to what values we should or should not have -- what kind of Being we Ought to have.  Perhaps this debate on values is the extreme relativism you are referring to?  Because where we are in conversation right now, seems terribly relativist.

 

If anything, philosophy as Deleuze put forth should create new ground so that we may recognize our way out of our current impasse our current mal de siecle.  I'm not so sure what this ground should look like... or even if Being as put forth by Heidegger is so relevant today, as is the practice of 'totalizing the field', holistic or otherwise.

 

Of course, there are other 'answers' to this which are not theoretical or philosophically based but it's much harder to articulate them within this context and perhaps much harder to evaluate than a philosopher's text.

[Toby Austin Locke]

Hi Alexander, I think you make some excellent observations and points. As you say it can be of questionable value to define a holistic theory but utilising different categories and modes of application is certainly of use. From my perspective, this is what much of post-structuralism is about, the acceptance of the fragmentary nature of perspective and modes of thought; also the refusal to grant one perspective inherent superiority over the other. However, we have to start somewhere so the application of theoretical models is inescapable; I would just consider it important to attempt this with as wide a variety as possible and not become too insistent that one model has the correct outlook.

The post-… perspective allows us to continue to utilise the previous models but not become tied down to their conclusions, categories or implications. Theoretical models can become more intersected, less logocentric and more fluid. The disunity of perspective is granted as a positive attribute rather than a solipsistic and negative one, it does not fall into the same trap as extreme relativism. Mary Midgley’s comments in ‘Science and Poetry’ I think are of great importance here. Namely that one mode of thought cannot explain all; science does not have all the answers, nor does poetry. When considering the position of post-modernism with the development of theories and ideas she states,

“the Enlightenment is not something safely tucked away in the past, something obsolete that we can patronise. It is where we still live. Post-modern insights are themselves a recognisable part of it. That movement still sets our current moral scene simply because we have not yet managed to resolve the deep clashes that arise between the various elements that were jammed together in its message” (2009: 222)

It is clear, at least I think it is, that each system of thinking must be related to others and all can be of use in a more holistic understanding.

[Alexander Lee]

Very hard to respond this much later since you all bring up such interesting examples and arguments.

 

Just my two cents, but I'll try very hard to be brief about my thoughts on this.

 

I think that if one looks at how thought is applied one can see a distinction between the literalness inherent in structuralism and the meta- of post-modernity on the level of categories and 'substance'.  Structuralism at its most theoretical offers a very rigid set of relations (binary or not... this parenthetical is a joke.. ha?).  When one gets into the nitty gritty of cultural reality, Structural can easily begin to deteriorate.  Post-structuralism also utilizes categorization but allows a freer, more organic set of relations like the 70's language poetry or even e.e. cummings.  This is how I find Zizek to be a structuralist even while being post-modern when late Deleuze is post-structuralist without necessarily being post-modern (although one could argue he was a structuralist even as recent as Anti-Oedipus and Logic of Sense).

 

So Deleuze would be a modernist because modernism (like the many art forms that are in fact modernist) deals with a singularity of expression, a reduction of material relations to a single substance or form -- like citizenship (or the many modes of D&G eg, de/re-territorialization or plateaus or facality or becoming -- certainly not together unified but each being wholly of a singular expression).  Post-modernism is, very politically speaking, the inclusion of multiple substances or forms or at least the recognition that any system of thought or speech has an innate inability to incorporate Alterity. (Is there a true 'other' in D&G?  Certainly not like there is in Lacan).  How this lack of inclusion happens might be like politically correct speech or multiculturalism.  For instance, post-modernism can be as absurd as Steven Colbert's concept of 'truthiness' which is more about inclusion and negativity (what his character leaves out, avoids speaking about and disavows the existence of) than it is about what his super-patriotic character is trying to present as the social reality.  (I mean, Colbert's show is post-modern.  Colbert's character is modern.)  In this way, I think we can see much of American political speech as being post-modern even though they attempt 'to pundit' their way into a kind of Modernism.  Likewise much post-modern like post-modern discourse, functions by incorporating or recognizing the viability of traditionally unincorporated 'substance' like art made from garbage, or elephant shit, or the feminist art of the 70s that took traditionally feminist forms of craft and placed them into high-art settings in big museums and galleries.

 

At least, that's how I have found most useful when looking at this topic.  While I think it is of questionable value to academically define a theory as being wholly in a particular practice (I am not accusing anyone of this, just making a statement), I do think that citing different modes of application as specific categories can be a good pedagogical tool.  We can begin to understand the differences in approach -- 'how' an argument or position functions within a web of meaning without as much risk in being bogged in a 'this vs that' kind of settlement.  I guess that makes me post-structuralist, even if it doesn't necessarily include me under post-modern.

[Toby Austin Locke]

Again, I have been away from this post for a while focusing on the set course readings I must undertake so apologies my response to John's challenge being rather delayed.

This is certainly the more difficult, and monumentally more significant, task of relating the works of Deleuze directly to social science in the context of a category such as culture. Considering the apparently ungenerous descriptions of human science by Deleuze (and Guattari) the hopeful anthropologist wishing to make use of his works is often left with a feeling that the task of describing, or defining, society is that of the sub-labourer to the philosopher. A view of such disciplines can be formed from the Deleuzian outlook which sees such endeavours as those of pre-paradigmatic schools of thought. This, in my view, is not correct but is rather a reading which perceives Deleuze's perspectives on all 'social' as negative. I would suggest that rather he sees the current discussions of the 'social' which opt for quasi-scientific descriptions, simplistic arborescent systems and easily obtainable answers as negative. If the study of the 'social' is able to escape its desire to be able to explain all, provide grand explanations and complete conclusions and rather acknowledge the ever changing, evolving and nomadic nature of that which becomes bound as 'social' it may be able to advance beyond semi/quasi-structural descriptions. If this is achievable, which I am unsure it is, the social scientist may see that to draw a total conclusion, provide a cultural model or theoretical explanation is somewhat of a absurdity founded in ethnocentrism, egocentrism and western individualism. Had social scientists been accepting of the impossibility of grand conclusions I feel Deleuze may have been more forgiving for, as anyone reading his texts will find, he does draw upon the findings of anthropologists and sociologists regularly but in altered context.

I feel, at this moment, that in this regard two concepts of immediate use to anthropology and ethnography: namely 'assemblage' and 'becoming'.

To remind ourselves of the remarks made by Marcel Mauss on the category of the person is of use in an anthropologically engaged understanding of assemblage and becoming. The notion of the individual or person as a closed off conscious entity able to exist independent to others, in-itself and for-itself is shown as a culturally specific notion of not intrinsic to humanity. It is a notion of specific origin, dependant on a variety of thought patterns and factors. It is the result of relations of becoming causing the construction of an assemblage. The identity of the person being granted by their ancestors, their immediate relations to the physical realm of both people and things. The becoming found between mother and child, the season and conception, the location and operation. These complex affective relations, each engaged with others resulting in various complex and interlinked assemblages. The person, the 'I' the 'me' is a response of affective relations and particular occurrences, Mauss attributing somewhat to Christianity but perhaps we could now attribute it partially to neo-liberalism and the ever increasing force of the global market. The 'person' is an assemblage, it is suggestive, it is not defined but pointed to for it cannot be reduced to a taxonomical definition and in Mauss's own words is “imprecise, delicate and fragile”. It is a manufactured concept if we seek to clearly draw boundaries around it rather than accepting its fluidity and the impossibility of perfect description. Rather than being a category it can maybe be an assemblage and rather than being a conceptual construction it can maybe be a product of becoming.

We may also consider Meyer's description of the Pintupi notion of “The Dreaming”. The Dreaming constitutes the lived world, it is a creative epoch. The physicality of things, people and places is granted from The Dreaming. It is actual (mularrpa), there is no fictional category for the Pintupi. It may not be directly visible (yuti) to all, but it remains real (mularrpa), it is experienceable at least from second hand description (tjukurrpa). That which exists in the physical or visible (yuti) world has its foundation in The Dreaming. The monitor lizard (ngintaka) mountain is the monitor lizard, it does not represent it, its body conceived in The Dreaming forms the mountain. Equally people are conceived in The Dreaming and from it the country (ngurra) takes it form. “they speak of conception and birth as the emergence of an individual from the plane of The Dreaming onto the physical phenomenal plane of existence”. The Dreaming is not the same as dreams: dreams can see The Dreaming which is an alternate vision of reality. The Dreaming transcends the immediate spatio-temporal position.

Meyer concludes that The Dreaming dichotomizes existence, the visible and the invisible – the physical and the dreaming. It is compared to platonic metaphysics and the realm of forms. This conclusion contradicts the preceding description. It imprisons the notion of The Dreaming into a arborescent system, a structure a final explanation. It ignores that fact that it is described by the Pintupi as actual, real or 'true' (mularrpa) but rather than always being visible 1st hand (yuti) it often only visible 2nd hand (tjukurrpa). None the less it is not a separate entity to the physical formation of reality for it constitutes the physicality of people, places and things. Perhaps we can better consider it as a process of becoming which constructs a variety of assemblages. It is a complex set of affective relations becoming a physicality. To dichotomise it would be to loose sight of its reality, what it really means and to imprison it in a preconceived metaphysical description. Now, of course the obvious criticism to the approach I have describe as an alternative to Meyer's it that it is guilty of the same crime he committed: imposing a concept developed by a western philosopher to a situation where it may no apply, I impose assemblage and becoming onto the Pintupi. The difference to the assemblage/becoming approach to the structural/dichotomous approach is that it remains incomplete, open and nomadic. It does not draw clear boundaries but remain itself in a process of becoming, it claims no grand theory but accepts the impossibility of a simplistic answer to potentially unanswerable questions. It does not draw a line under the Pintupi culture and The Dreaming claiming to have provided a description and understanding but rather shows us the complexity of the issue. Asides, all that can be asked is that we do the best with the tools at our disposal and thus if we were unable to ever regard the Pintupi from our own eyes we may as well all give up anthropology right now.

From these examples we can abstract to the problematic category of culture which is buy its very nature incomplete, non-structural and affective. If we impose culture as a complete concept upon reality then we are enforcing meaning, significance and definition upon it. We can instead approach it as an assemblage constituted from becoming and through statements rather than concepts or facts we may seek to understand its deep, complex and affective nature without falling into the taxonomical trap which would see English culture, Indian culture and Brazilian culture, in turn male culture, female culture and adolescent culture and in turn to an infinite regress to the sub cultures, as separate definable entities. To see it as an incomplete, undefined assemblage developed through becoming escapes the rigidity of such an approach allowing for a better understanding of ideas like The Pintupi's The Dreaming and the western notion of the person. A clear answer need not be reached for it is not necessarily possible.

Having realised how long it has taken me to tentatively sketch an answer to John's question I will try and address some other points of discussion as shortly as possible.

Deconstruction, from my view and that of Butler and Heesun (if I have read right), is not negation but a demonstration of the interlinked nature of any concepts which are placed in binary opposition. We need not abandon those concepts deconstructed but merely acknowledge their incomplete and open nature allowing for a more engaged, critical and in depth discussion.

I would suggest that all theories are interpretive including GST and structuralism, they are responses to specific spatio-temporal relationships and remain subjective projects of a subjective mind. Science itself, be it string theory, quantum mechanics or stem cell development is equally such a product, it cannot escape human perspective.If anthropology is handed over to utter scientific objectivity it will never be able to escape the limits of such a way of thought. Furthermore there is no reason that emic and etic analyses should be separate for as Marshall Sahlins so rightly states: “ All etics or languages of objective scientific description (so-called) are based on a grid of meaningful or emic distinctions”. I do not see such a clear distinction between 'theoretical' and 'subjective'. If there is an obvious one perhaps someone may be able to sketch it out for me.

The fragmentation of perspectives in inescapable and so we cannot really expect to come to an agreeable definition for everything, as frustrating as it may be. Surely this does not mean something is not doable but rather grants it is true universality, in the purest sense, applicability and beauty. If we all agreed on every definition and meaning of everything would we need anthropology at all? And would social science even make sense?

[M Izabel]

Maybe I should put it this way-- In relation to reality, postmodernism is far from it.  That's why it only exists in art, drama, and fiction.

 

My understanding of Thomas Theorem is that any interpretation of any situation effects an action or a consequence.  I believe it is true for all things and situations, real or imagined.  Even the belief in fountain of youth that is not real has a real consequence such as the case of a Spanish conquistador who might have explored Florida for the water that would cure his aging.  Even if the consequence of his false belief/idea was real, it did not make his belief/idea real.  Even telling a lie has a consequence that is true and real.  One of the real consequences of postmodernism is the commercialization of scholarship-- where books after books in social science are published even though they are theoretically incoherent,  highly imaginative, and far from being empirical/scientific.

[John McCreery]

Note: Thomas didn't say that situations (or other "things") are real. He said that if people believe they are real, then they are real in their consequences. Was the Gulf of Tonkin incident "real"? Perhaps not. The Vietnam War certainly was. Is a lover's promise real? Again, perhaps not. But if the other believes the promise and acts accordingly, again the consequences are real. Postmodernism and dragons are real in the same way. Both have had real consequences — a flood of possibly wasted verbiage on the one hand, numerous bits of sculpture on Chinese temples on the other. 

 

Personally, I have found reading "pomo" writers productive, but not because I swallow everything they say. They have made me notice things I hadn't paid much attention to when my head was filled with social forces. I think, for example, of  the importance of seduction and simulacra in contemporary (but now, I believe) all culture. 

 

Stimulated by Toby's enthusiasm and Heesun's remarks about Deleuze and Whitehead, I discovered on my bookshelves a copy of Deleuze (1993) The Fold. It may or may not contain a plausible metaphysics—I still have to think about that. It is certainly an interesting take on Leibniz and the Baroque, and since I am interested in Leibniz, I might read further. 

[M Izabel]

I guess the fire-spewing gigantic horned and bearded dragon is real.

[John McCreery]

"Doable" doesn't mean to me that you or I could or would do it or that there is recipe book somewhere to explain the methodology. Hasn't kept a lot of people  from doing stuff that other people have, either pro or con, gotten awfully excited about. As W.I.Thomas said, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." In that sense, it seems not only doable but done as far as I'm concerned.

[M Izabel]

How can it be doable when we cannot even agree what postmodernism is?  In my reading, postmodernism cannot stand alone and independent from other social, cultural, art, and literary theories.  It has to use feminism, for example, to make sense or performance theory to be understandable and visible.  Generally, postmodernism is simply viewed as the deviation from the conventions.  A Russian theater director was called postmodernist because he staged "The Taming of The Shrew" with his actors in leather, balls, and chains.  I don't think that's postmodernism but radicalism, maybe, which is not an idea unique to postmodernism.

[John McCreery]

Not doable? People have been doing a lot of it (for good or ill is another question). Perhaps we should think of it like poetry or improv. You can pick up the vocabulary, learn a few standard moves. Then, it's up to inspiration. Works some of the time—some people are really good at it. They are, however, rare. A virtue of old-fashioned normal science (or scholarship) is that it gives the rest of us, who lack the divine madness, useful if pedestrian things to do.